

REFLECTIONS

ON THE

DOCTRINE OF MATERIALISM;

AND THE APPLICATION OF THAT DOCTRINE TO THE
PRE-EXISTENCE OF CHRIST:

ADDRESSED TO

JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, LL. D. F. R. S.

WITH AN APPENDIX:

BRIEFLY STATING THE

SUBSTANCE OF A CORRESPONDENCE

BETWEEN

DR. PRIESTLEY AND DR. PRICE,
ON THE SUBJECT;

AS FAR AS THAT CORRESPONDENCE AFFECTS THE
PRECEDING REFLECTIONS.

BY PHILALETHERS RUSTICANS.

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MDCCCLXXIX.

REFLECTIONS

ON THE

DOCTRINE OF MATERIALISM;

AND THE APPLICATION OF THAT DOCTRINE TO THE

PRESISTENCE OF CHRIST:

ADDRESSED TO

JOSEPH PRISTLEY, M.D.F.R.S.

WITH AN APPENDIX

REPLYING TO THE

OBJECTIONS OF CORRESPONDENTS



ON THE

AS FAR AS THAT CORRESPONDENTS AFFECT THE
PRECEDING REVISIONS.

BY THE AUTHOR

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T O

JOSEPH PRIESTLEY,

LL. D. F. R. S.

S I R,

THE late appearance of the subsequent pages, after two or three direct replies have been made to your *Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit*, and the manner in which they are introduced to the public, so different from that which you have *prescribed* to those antagonists, who may expect replies, demand an apology; which you will be pleased to accept in the spirit of ingenuous truth, instead of an adulatory dedication.

ii DEDICATION.

The immortality of the soul is a notion, with which I must own, those wicked Heathens of Greece and Rome, whom you so bitterly reprobate, had strongly impressed me : and the scriptures, as I thought, adding their suffrage to the truth of the doctrine, confirmed me in it. When the Heathen poet's "*Divinæ particula auræ*" returned, in the language of an inspired writer, *to Him, who gave it* : I conceived, if words had any meaning, those words of the sacred penman, describing the soul as *returning to God*, however or wheresoever to be disposed of by him, could not mean the annihilation of it.

A promise, so expressly made, of such a comfortable refuge, at the very door of death, from the anxieties and disappointments, the numberless " evils
that

D E D I C A T I O N. iii

that mortality is heir to," I eagerly embraced; and should never have wished to be called on to discuss the truth of it. If a delusion, it is a pleasant, it is, to speak most hardly of it, a harmless one: from the charms of which in delivering me,

— "Pol me occidis, amice."

The nature of the subject, the reputation of the author, as soon as ever your publication appeared, attracted my attention. And the Reflections, which have resulted from a candid and impartial examination of it, would long ago have been addressed to you; had not "a Free Discussion of the subject, in a correspondence between Dr. Priestley and Dr. Price," many months past been publicly announced; calculated, I suppose, to arrest the judgment of eager readers,

readers,

iv DEDICATION.

readers, and to stop the pens of *hasty* antagonists. It had that effect on mine; and with due deference to two such splendid characters I immediately dropped it: resolved to wait for a sight of, if I may be indulged your own terms, that *singular spectacle*. * This, Sir, and my distant situation from the press, have retarded the present publication long beyond the purposed time. But the subject is not a temporary one: nor is your performance of that slight and superficial cast, which may be soon forgotten.

My next subject of apology, is the irregular manner, in which these Reflections are introduced to the public: irregular I mean, if measured by the rules

* Introd. to Free Correspondence, p. 1.

DEDICATION. 17

rules † you have thought fit to *prescribe* to your antagonists. You require the real name of your opponent: whereas I must ingenuously acknowledge myself to have assumed a fictitious one: for which, however, your next requisition will best plead my excuse; wherein you require not only a name, but a name famous in the literary world, as a metaphysician or divine. Alas! Sir, I presume not to aspire to fame in either science. My time hath been chiefly spent in the shades of obscurity; where, in literary pursuits, inclination led me rather to consult my ease, than sacrifice to fame; secure from censure, and not vainly courting applause; no member of a little circle, who gull the world with mutual pangenyricks

* Pref. to Disq. p. 19.

vi DEDICATION.

negyricks on ourselves, while, union
giving strength and confidence,

——“*Famam petimus damusque vicissim.*”

My obscurity will at least give you
this advantage, that you may rank me,
as suits your vein of humour best:
either among your *Scotch Antagonists*,
whom you affect so contemptuously to
group; among the divines of the esta-
blished church, against whom you have
been pleased to bar the door of meta-
physics, modestly asserting, that *HALF*
of the metaphysicians of the nation are
*formed in the dissenting Academies;**
or among the retailers of periodical li-
terature, whom you *seldom deign to*
look on: believe me to be a lover of
truth,

* Free Correspondence, p. 370.

DEDICATION. vii

truth, and in your estimation, place me wherever you please. A name so unembellished, and unknown as mine, that cannot spangle in the front, with either F. R. S. or LL. D. in my train, would add neither weight to my arguments, nor dignity to my page: and the preservation of your dignity, is, I trust, best consulted in the concealment of it.

I must apologize for a breach, if a breach it be, of one more of your articles: it is that which enjoins *decency*. If by decency you mean tameness, that *sang froid* of controversy, you seem to have courted, and in some of your antagonists experienced; “*confitentem habes reum.*” But if, by your in-
junction

VIII DEDICATION.

junction of decency, you mean only to exclude an insolent affectation of superiority, and coarse language, unenlivened by a single grain of humour, such as we have both seen blot the productions of some authors, you shall find in me no just cause of complaint.

An ingenious writer, whom you have yourself more than once named with respect, humourously observes, that
“ if it were to be determined by a general ballot, what particular classes
“ of writers should be condemned to
“ everlasting silence, polemic divines
“ would infallibly be honoured with the
“ first majority.” * To give life and
spirit

* Prefat. Disc. to Histor. view of the contro. concerning an intermediate state, p. 1.

DEDICATION. in
spirit to the dulness of theological controversy, a little raillery perhaps is not amiss; and I hold it within the bounds of decency,

“Fortius & melius magnas plerumque secat res
“Ridiculum acri.”

The argument *ad hominem*, is not always the worst argument, if unvenomed with malignity. And why should it not be so on a point of controversy, in which truth only is concerned; and between persons so entirely unknown to each other, as yourself and me? No gall rankles at the heart, and I can say with confidence, I have intentionally given no reason to charge with a drop of acrimony, the pen of him, who has been frequently
known

x D E D I C A T I O N.

known to pay his full tribute of praise
to many of your productions, and
who is,

S I R,

With much respect,

Your obedient

Humble servant,

PHILALETHES RUSTICANS.

P R E-

P R E F A C E.

THE first and second parts of this reply were written before any other answer appeared, or had been formally promised: and, though from the similar nature of the several publications that have, on this occasion, appeared, some similar observations must, of course, occur in them; I find myself anticipated in fewer, than might have been expected. In my arguments, I have aimed at perspicuity and conciseness; neither cavilling with my author about words, nor perplexing my reader with intricate digressions: confining my observations, on the general ground I have taken, to the subject in
view;

xcii P R E F A C E.

view; and chiefly to the author's reasonings upon it.

*He scruples not to acknowledge, that a great deal of odium * would fall on him from profest Christians. And why so: but from the supposed ill-tendency of those his labours? Notwithstanding which, he thinks a very few converts, of a philosophical turn of mind, will abundantly compensate for the ill opinion of many well meaning Christians. The conversion of a very few infidels, of a philosophical turn of mind, on which the author presumes, if he possessed any share of vanity, might flatter it: but how it should compensate for the odium, which he foresees the ill-tendency of his doctrines will draw on him from many well-meaning*

* Pref. to Disq. p. 16, and 17.

P R E F A C E. xiii

ing Christians, I can not readily comprehend. Is not the soul of an illiterate well meaning Christian as valuable, and his peace of mind as precious, as those of the most distinguished infidels ?

And the misfortune is, as his labours have no merit to plead with the infidels, he will have no quarter from them. He is exercising on them the most wanton cruelty : on their principle, by denying the immortality of the soul, he breaks down the partition wall between virtue and vice, and dooms them soul and body to the horror of annihilation. Persuade an infidel, that the whole man, becomes extinct at death ; that he is then inferior to the worm, that feeds on him, brother and co-equal with the dust : persuade a man of this, who is already persuaded of the falsity
of

xiv P R E F A C E.

of the Christian religion, and if you do not render him miserable on earth, nothing on earth will do it.

Yet the author expects converts from infidelity to the Christian cause: I would wish to know, on what ground he forms his expectations; for the object of the publication alluded to, is not to enforce the truth and credibility of the christian religion. Does he expect to fright men, of the philosophical turn of mind, he describes, into the belief of doctrines, into which he can not reason them? This would be to exercise a kind of inquisitorial power on the mind; and the weak and timid would be his only converts.

It seems however to be the author's opinion, that the establishment of the truth of his

P R E F A C E. xv

his doctrine will promote the cause of christianity. I must own the matter strikes me in a very different light. But I will fairly state the case; and to the judgment of the impartial, submit the propriety of our different sentiments.

Let us suppose the gospel of Jesus Christ, and particularly the doctrine of the resurrection, to be proposed to two persons: the one, believing the whole man, soul and body, to be material, and of course after death entirely extinct; and the other, as firmly persuaded, that the soul was naturally immortal, and that the body only was after death resolved into its original dust: which of these possessed a mind, best prepared to admit the doctrine of a resurrection to life, after an indefinite number of years; he, who, supposing the soul necessarily to exist, has to add to his belief the article of its reunion with the material part, it once ani-

b

mented;

mated; or he, to whom, believing the entire extinction of the whole man, the doctrine of a resurrection is the doctrine of a new creation; I leave to the determination of the unprejudiced reader.

The extinction of soul and body is in fact the annihilation of the man: and at the apprehension of annihilation nature revolts. But the God of nature, and of truth, can not be supposed to have implanted in the human mind an abhorrence of, and aversion from, a doctrine of truth. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul, if a deceit, is both a pleasing and a general one: and the Christian dispensation doth strongly enforce it. Unless we are to suppose with our author, that Christ and his apostles, in compliance with the prevailing opinion of the times, taught a doctrine which they did not believe. * We know, says the apostle Paul,

* Disq. p. 129.

P R E F A C E. xvii

Paul, that if the earthly house of this tabernacle shall be destroyed, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens, 2 Cor. v. 1.

Upon this passage I must observe, that the word οὐρανός, or οὐρανοί, does not always denote the place of finally remunerated and perfectly happy spirits. It sometime, signifies the air, so we find the birds stiled πτερινα τῶν οὐρανῶν; sometimes the expanse, in which the stars are placed, the stars shall fall from Heaven, Matt. xxiv. 29, Mark xiii. 25. and sometimes the intermediate state: that state into which Christ is received till the restitution of all things: that state into which St. Paul desired from the storms and tempests of this world to emigrate, and be with Christ: in short that state, into which we confide in admission, when-

whenever our earthly house of this tabernacle shall be dissolved. And here I would ask the author, whether the idea of a tenant or inhabitant do not, in this passage, cleave inseparably to the terms οἰκία and σκηνος.

The author has prefixed to his work, a catalogue of authors referred to in the course of it. But, what is very remarkable, in a writer of reputation, he generally contents himself with quotations at second hand: and this too, when he tells us, "he might with no great trouble have given those opinions from the original authors themselves." * The reason he gives for not doing it, displays, it must be acknowledged, his modesty in an eminent degree: it is, "because he was

* Pref. to Disq. p. 29.

“confident, that the opinion of these
 “writers would be more respected than
 “his own.” Had another made the
 apology for him, he would not, have
 been a little offended at it: even
 though he had qualified it with the rea-
 son, that “they could not be suspected of
 “partiality to his hypothesis.” To talk
 of partiality for an hypothesis, in this
 case, is ridiculous. What, partiality for
 an hypothesis, which, if true, robs us of
 our existence? The author may believe
 it true; but no wise and good man can
 wish it to be so; no not for an indefinite
 number of years, for a month, or a
 day.

For my own part, whatever may be
 my author's opinion of second-hand quota-
 tions, I esteem them very unsatisfactory.

The

The occasion, on which a thing is said, the manner of saying it, the general scope of the author, with many other accidental circumstances, often create in the sense and spirit of passages, a great difference from what the words may seem primarily and literally to express. And nothing but the want of books, not the least want experienced in an obscure situation, induces me to take on the credit of those writers, from whom my author is contented to quote, their extracts from original authors, so constructed and represented, as they are pleased to exhibit them.

THE

THE great distance of the Author's residence from the press, must plead his excuse for the following list of errors.

ERRATA.

Page

24	For momentum,	read velocity.
31	— buried,	— busied.
65	— the passages,	— these passages.
70	— be tower,	— the tower.
74	— and whenever,	— and wherever,
75	— evinces,	— evinces.
75	— of it,	— of them.
86	— μ	— μ
90	— eat of it,	— eat.
93	— and no more,	— no more.
104	— such	— those.
153	— $\epsilon\delta\eta\mu\sigma\epsilon\upsilon$,	— $\epsilon\delta\eta\mu\sigma\epsilon\upsilon$.
153	— $\epsilon\delta\eta\mu\sigma\epsilon\upsilon$,	— $\epsilon\delta\eta\mu\sigma\epsilon\upsilon$.
155	— nankind,	— mankind.
163	— mote,	— more.
189	— or,	— nor.
212	— no little,	— so little.
214	— Jews,	— Jews?
224	Dele from <i>Is there,</i>	to acknowledge it.
214	for <i>Angles,</i>	read <i>Angels.</i>

Е - Р - А - Т - А

[illegible]

REFLECTIONS

O N

MATERIALISM, &c.

WHILE one sect of philosophers tell us, there is no such thing as matter; and another as confidently assert, there exists nothing in nature but matter: though such diversity of opinion will not justify us in concluding, that truth lies between the two extremes; it will, at least, countenance us, in supposing, this may be the case. Both these opinions cannot be true; and both may be false. But that which admits the existence of matter, and also of something else, something of a more refined nature, of superior power and energy, which we term spirit, may be absolutely true, and cannot be totally false.

B

An

An author of no small name in the literary world, has lately undertaken the disagreeable task of humbling the pride of human nature, by endeavouring to prove, that the doctrine of the soul's immortality is an amusing fiction : unsupported either by reason or revelation ; and demonstrably false upon the principles of sound philosophy. His performance may be resolved into three parts. In the first he attempts, on physical principles, to establish the doctrine of the materiality, and consequently mortality, of the soul : in the second he alledges, in support of this doctrine, the concurrent voice of scripture : and in the last part, applies it in favour of the Socinian-scheme, and in proof of Christ's real and absolute humanity. According to this division of his work, in the subsequent reflections I mean to attend him.

After stating the common, which he calls *vulgar* opinions, concerning the nature and properties of matter, he proceeds to contro-

vert

vert the truth of them: the most generally acknowledged properties of it he rejects, and endeavours to establish others in their room. He considers matter, not as that inert substance, which it is commonly represented, but as possessing the powers of attraction and repulsion. In support of its inherent attraction, he advances the following sophism. *Every body must consist of figure, that figured thing must consist of parts, and those parts must cohere; for separate them ad infinitum, and you destroy the matter.*

His own words are: “ It will readily be
 “ allowed, that every body, as solid and
 “ impenetrable, must necessarily have some
 “ particular form or shape; but it is no less
 “ obvious, that no such figured thing can
 “ exist, unless the parts of which it consists
 “ have a mutual attraction, so as either to
 “ keep contiguous to, or preserve a certain
 “ distance from each other. This power

4 REFLECTIONS ON MATERIALISM.

“ of attraction, therefore, must be essential
“ to the actual existence of all matter ;
“ since no substance can retain any form
“ without it.” He then adds, “ This ar-
“ gument equally affects the *smallest* atoms,
“ as the largest bodies that are composed
“ of them. An atom, by which I mean
“ an *ultimate* component part of any gross
“ body, is necessarily supposed to be per-
“ fectly solid, wholly impervious to any
“ other atom ; and it must also be round
“ or square, or of some other determinate
“ form. But the parts of such a body (as
“ this solid atom must be *divisible*, and
“ therefore have parts) must be infinitely
“ hard, and therefore must have powers of
“ mutual attraction, infinitely strong, or it
“ could not hold together, that is, it could
“ not exist as a solid atom.”*

Upon these terms, the author will give
me leave to observe, that if his atom be the
smallest

* Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit, p. 5.

smallest, or more properly, the *supposed smallest* particle of matter, an ultimate of a gross body, and that ultimate be not, as philosophers have generally supposed solid, and indiscerpible, but consist of parts; I think the author has an insuperable difficulty to surmount in ascertaining what it is, of which those parts consist. His atom, he says, must be round or square. But in order to be round or square, it must be something. For roundness or squareness without substance, it is not easy to conceive.

Mathematicians talk of the infinite divisibility of matter : but I conceive, the term cannot be properly applied to physics. And I ground my opinion upon an observation of Sir Isaac Newton. He inclines to think that God in the beginning formed matter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable particles, of such sizes and figures, and with such other properties, and in such proportion to space, as most conduced to the end for
**
which

which he framed them ; and that these primitive particles, being solids, are incomparably harder than any porous bodies compounded of them ; even so very hard, as never to wear or break in pieces. No ordinary power being able to divide what God himself made one in the first creation.* Those solid, massy, impenetrable particles, are represented as in their own nature unperishable : and, therefore, upon our author's own reasoning, † to which he cannot object, if these small particles of matter cannot be destroyed, they cannot be infinitely separated ; and of course, must subsist without cohesion.

And not only simple indivisible particles of matter exist without cohesion : it cannot be inherent even in compounded bodies. For if so, we must admit in the same body two different and contradictory tendencies ; the attraction of cohesion and of gravitation :
which

* See Newt. Op. also his Pr. 1. 3.

† Disq. p. 7.

which is absurd. The mutual conatus of different parts of matter to approach each other, and a conatus to gravitate in another direction, being contrary tendencies, cannot consist in the same subject : because, if equal, they would destroy each other ; if unequal, the greater would exclude the efficiency of the less.

Though the plastic Author of all things hath, by an art unknown and unconceivable by us, for nature is the art of God, so framed the particles of matter, that, aptly corresponding in form and figure, they will, when properly acted on, exactly fit and adhere to each other ; yet we can with no more propriety say, that the attraction of cohesion is a property of these particles, than we can assert, on seeing a cabinet, that the general cohesion of its parts is essential to the wood that composes it. The component parts are in their nature inert, and the cohesion arises from the art and power of the maker. Place

bowls as near each other as you please, and let them lie there to eternity, without some foreign power, they will never cohere : but, let an artist alter the form and figure of those substances, and he will be able, by an exertion of power, to give them cohesion. The figure of matter I conceive to be that which produces an aptitude to cohere : and a communication of power *ab extra*, gives to that aptitude efficiency.

When our author speaks of the attraction of cohesion, not only as a property of matter, but a power inherent in it ; he must pre-suppose some subject or substratum, in which that power resides. For what is meant by cohesion ? Is it not a cohesion of parts ? And those parts must be something solid : for a cohesion of nothings will never produce something ; according to one plain rule of philosophizing ; viz. *that the effect cannot be more perfect, either in kind or degree, than its cause.* Cohesion therefore implies solidity ;
or

or it imports nothing: take this away, and the idea of cohesion vanishes.

It is foreign to the present design, to enquire into the various hypotheses that have been framed, to account for the cohesion of matter; whether there be in the particles of it, Hamuli or branches, whereby they are implicated and entangled in one another; whether they are compressed by the effect of a super-incumbent and surrounding fluid; or are kept together by the more immediate impulse of the deity indefinitely imprest upon it. My object is only to evince, that it is not, it cannot be a power inherent in matter,

Nor can the attraction of gravitation, the most universal principle of matter, be the action of matter on matter. We must have recourse to a primary cause, that has more power and energy, than matter possesses. "Gravitation," says Dr. Clarke, "is ever proportional, not at all to the surface" — "faces

TO REFLECTIONS ON MATERIALISM.

“ faces of bodies, or of their particles in
 “ any possible supposition, but exactly to
 “ the solid content of bodies. ’Tis evident,
 “ it cannot be caused by matter acting upon
 “ the surfaces of matter, which is all it can
 “ do; but must (either immediately or me-
 “ diately) be caused by something, which
 “ continually penetrates its solid substance.
 “ But in animals, which have a power of self-
 “ motion, and in the perfecter sorts of them,
 “ which have still higher faculties, the thing
 “ is yet more evident.” * I think, his ar-
 gument is unanswerable. In regard to spon-
 taneous motion, the power that moves the
 limbs, being confined in narrow bounds,
 must, in some actions, exert an almost in-
 credible force. Borellus hath calculated the
 force exerted within the body, in one parti-
 cular action of the muscles, to be two hun-
 dred and nine times greater, than the weight
 required to be supported without. † Mecha-
 nism

* Demonstrat. of the Being and Attr. of God, prop. 2.

† Si brachium humanum usque ad extremos digitos ma-
 nus supine, in directum proximè, et horizontaliter exten-
 sum

nism will never account for such effects; nor will any thing less, than the admission of an immaterial cause.

And if matter require a constant impression *ab extra*, to cause its particles to *cobere* and *gravitate*; its inertion, in respect to the property of *resistance*, is equally apparent. Call that property a power, and distinguish it with whatever titles we please, we can never endow it with activity; of which matter is totally void. It is a power perfectly passive: a power of not acting: a power to resist every conatus *ab extra*, to cause in it a change of state. And a power not to act, till acted upon, is not a power inherent in the subject; is properly no power at all, but a compleat inertion.

Possessing

sum fuerit; et in extremitatibus quatuor digitorm suspendatur maximum pondus, quod sustineri potest in tali situ: potentia apparens, quam natura exercet contrahendo omnes musculos brachii, qui ad prædicti ponderis suspensionem concurrunt, plusquam 209 est ponderis sustentati.

Borell. de Mot. Animal. part. i. prop. 45.

Possessing a resistance to all change of state, matter cannot also have a tendency to change its state, in which consists activity: it cannot have two opposite tendencies, for reasons already given. And this property of matter is just the same in motion, as at rest. Let some external power communicate motion to it: and having no power in itself, but a passive impulse to persevere in the same state in which it is; it would continue its motion, unless checked by some foreign power, as long as its existence lasted. Our author's flourish, therefore, about the repulsive powers of matter, is nugatory: inherent inertion, and inherent activity, cannot in the same subject consist.

This solidity, or impenetrability, Keil observes, is proper to bodies only; and so essential to all of them, that you cannot even separate it from them in your imagination; but at the same time, you destroy the very

idea

idea which you had formed of body. * Our author, on the contrary, asserts, that resistance is caused by something, the very reverse of any thing material or solid; viz. by a power of repulsion. † Ask, in what resides that power; for the repulsive power here described, is a mere quality, and, as has been noticed of the power of attraction, must have some subject to reside in; and the answer is, that it resides in matter. But what is matter? It is an extended *something*: to which, as Keil well observes, solidity is so essential, that it cannot, even in imagination, be separated from it. So that the resistance of matter arises from its repulsive powers; and its repulsive powers from its solidity, or *vis inertiae*. Oh, no: this would lay an *odium* on matter, ‡ which it is the great object of our author's labours to remove.

In

* Introd. ad ver. Physf. lec. 2.

† Disq. p. 11.

‡ Ib. p. 17.

In his endeavour to divest matter of its inertion, he labours under very discouraging circumstances; for could he effect this point, it would serve his cause but little: yet if that property of it remain established, and I see nothing in our author's reasoning, of weight sufficient to remove it, it entirely ruins his system. For, granting all, that in this state of the argument he contends for; supposing matter possess of the properties, or, if he please, of the powers of attraction and repulsion: what does he gain by the concession? Surely to infer from thence, that it is capable of thought and perception, is a long leap to a distant conclusion. Yet our author, like an old sportsman, boldly takes it. "The power," says he, "of sensation, perception, and thought, as belonging to man, have never been found, but in conjunction with a certain organized system; and therefore, these powers necessarily exist in, and depend upon such a system." *

“system.”* That they exist in, and depend on such a system, are very different conclusions. If they be always found in such a system, they certainly exist in it: but it does not follow, that they depend on it: Though communicated to a certain organization of matter, they may be derived from another cause. And if I might be indulged a small alteration in the form of his argument, I think, the following conclusion would be the more natural and obvious one. ‘I find no such thing, as sensation, perception and thought, in any modification of matter, except one: and, those qualities being exceedingly different from the known properties of matter, I conclude, that, though found in such system, they are not derived from any particular organization of matter, but from some other cause.’

In attraction and repulsion, there is no advancement made towards thought. Shall

WQ

* Disq. p. 26.

we suppose, the magnet thinks, any more than the pebble that paves the streets? Or is it better prepared to receive the perceptive faculty? Omnipotence, we cannot doubt, is able to impart that faculty both to the one and the other; but then it will be in both a faculty, foreign and extrinsic; a faculty that does not belong to matter; a faculty superior to what matter possesses, and, therefore, such as could not be derived from it. For, if a being could receive from another being greater perfection, than that other being possessed, such superiority of perfection must be derived from nothing, and an effect be produced without a cause.* To pronounce that twenty, or any indefinite number of particles of matter, each of them without perception, or any approach to it, could, by being properly disposed, and aptly put together, perceive, think, compare, and reason, is as absurd, as to assert, that twenty nothings will make something;

OR

* Reflections on Materialism, &c. p. 3.

or twenty cyphers, a number. According to this philosophy, the *truncus olim fculus*, which was afterwards made a *priapus*, might, by being sawed in pieces, and these pieces recomposed, become an acute philosopher.

How strange, that a man, who can admit into his creed an article, big with such absurdities as these, should so strenuously deny the possibility of union, in a pure intelligence or immaterial principle and any system of matter ! “ It is contended,” says our author, “ by all metaphysicians, who
 “ maintain the doctrine of any proper im-
 “ material principle, that spirit and body
 “ can have no common property ; and when
 “ it is asked, how then can they act upon
 “ one another, and how can they be so in-
 “ timately connected, as to be continually
 “ and necessarily subject to each other’s in-
 “ fluence, it is acknowledged to be a dif-
 “ ficulty, and a mystery, that we cannot

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we suppose, the magnet thinks, any more than the pebble that paves the streets? Or is it better prepared to receive the perceptive faculty? Omnipotence, we cannot doubt, is able to impart that faculty both to the one and the other; but then it will be in both a faculty, foreign and extrinsic; a faculty that does not belong to matter; a faculty superior to what matter possesses, and, therefore, such as could not be derived from it. For, if a being could receive from another being greater perfection, than that other being possessed, such superiority of perfection must be derived from nothing, and an effect be produced without a cause.* To pronounce that twenty, or any indefinite number of particles of matter, each of them without perception, or any approach to it, could, by being properly disposed, and aptly put together, perceive, think, compare, and reason, is as absurd, as to assert, that twenty nothings will make something;

or

* Reflections on Materialism, &c. p. 8.

or twenty cyphers, a number. According to this philosophy, the *truncus olim ficulus*, which was afterwards made a *priapus*, might, by being sawed in pieces, and these pieces recomposed, become an acute philosopher.

How strange, that a man, who can admit into his creed an article, big with such absurdities as these, should so strenuously deny the possibility of union, in a pure intelligence or immaterial principle and any system of matter! "It is contended," says our author, "by all metaphysicians, who
 " maintain the doctrine of any proper im-
 " material principle, that spirit and body
 " can have no common property; and when
 " it is asked, how then can they act upon
 " one another, and how can they be so in-
 " timately connected, as to be continually
 " and necessarily subject to each other's in-
 " fluence, it is acknowledged to be a dif-
 " ficulty, and a mystery, that we cannot

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“comprehend. But had this question been
 “considered with due attention, what has
 “been called a difficulty, would, I doubt
 “not, have been deemed an impossibility.”
 And a little further, he adds, “Let a man
 “torture his imagination as much as he
 “pleases, I will pronounce it to be impos-
 “sible for him to conceive even the pos-
 “sibility of *mutual** action, without some
 “common property.” † This argument,
 if good for any thing, will prove a great
 deal: it proves the impossibility, not only
 of

* With regard to the action of the body upon the mind,
 with great deference to received opinions, I cannot but ex-
 press my doubt of it. Of the action and reaction of bodies
 upon one another, we are assured: but we can never prove,
 that the laws of matter apply to immaterial substances.
 Under certain circumstances, such as sickness, old age, and
 the like; the infirmities of the body, from its close union
 with the mind, do certainly impede its operations: but a
 thing when wrong, may be an impediment, which, when
 right, is not an acting cause. The mind may act on the
 sensorium, which may be too hard to admit its impressions,
 or too soft to return them; or the feeble organs may be
 unable to obey.

† Disquisitions, p. 60.

of the human mind acting upon the body, but of that eternal Spirit himself, the Author of nature, acting upon matter; and drives the author, as we shall find hereafter, to the desperate act of materializing the Deity. And the difficulty, to get rid of which our author took so bold a step, is pronounced to be an *impossibility*, only because this man of penetration cannot conceive it.

A Newton or a Boyle, to whom the volume of nature, if ever opened to man, lay open, would have expressed themselves with less confidence: cautious as they were, of dogmatizing on subjects beyond their reach, or of affecting to set bounds to the power of Omnipotence. The poet says,

“ Drink deep, or taste not ! ” —

The rule is good in every science, as well as poetry. A little philosophy gives men

strange conceits, and is so apt to swell the mind with extravagant notions of the natural powers of matter, that I have heard one of those wordy philosophers as glibly and confidently describe the fabrication of the universe, as if he had been present, *when God laid the foundations of the earth; and knew all the ordinances of Heaven.* *

When we consider what infinite Power may effect, we should be very cautious in determining what are impossibilities. We can pronounce nothing impossible, that does not fall within the reach of our senses, and imply a direct and absolute contradiction. I may venture to assert, that adequately to explain the nature of a being, which is the object of none of our senses, pertinently to argue upon its powers, and with certainty to determine the extent of them, approaches very near to an impossibility.

It

* Job, xxxviii, 4.

It is true, that God Almighty might reveal to us the nature of an immaterial substance; and, to enable us to comprehend it, he might also, at the same time, give us powers of conception, superiour to those, which we at present possess: but so endowed, we should be no longer men. We know but the surface of matter, and nothing of the nature of spirit: it is not an object of the senses; and therefore, our reasonings upon its powers, must be vague and indeterminate. “We have ground from Revelation,” says Mr. Locke, “and several other reasons, to believe with assurance, that there are such creatures [as finite spirits:] but our senses not being able to discover them, we want the means of knowing their existences.”* From such ignorance of the nature of the soul, though I may not be able to explain, how its influence on the body operates: yet this does not

* Locke on Hum. Und. b. 4. ch. 11, sect. 12.

not appear sufficient ground for me to assert, that no such influence can subsist :

“ Much of the soul they talk, but all awry.”

Let us, however, a little more closely examine our author's argument against the possible agency of the mind upon the body, which is founded on the essential difference of one from the other : the one being extended, and the other bearing no relation to space,

Whether spirit have no relation to space, or do occupy it, and in what manner, is, and ever must remain to us merely conjectural. Mr. Locke seems to admit the possibility of it. “ Finding,” says he, “ that
“ spirits, as well as bodies, cannot operate,
“ but where they are ; and that spirits do
“ operate at several times, in several places,
“ I cannot but attribute change of place
“ to

“to all finite spirits.”* And again, “If
 “it be said by any one, that it [spirit]
 “cannot change place, because it hath
 “none, for spirits are not in loco, but
 “ubi; I suppose, that way of talking will
 “not now be of much weight to many, in
 “an age that is not much disposed to ad-
 “mire, or suffer themselves to be deceived
 “by such untelligible ways of speaking.”†
 There is no absurdity in the supposition,
 that spirit may occupy space; as there is
 no impossibility in the fact. It may do
 this, in a manner as different from that, in
 which matter occupies it, as the respective
 natures of spirit and matter are from each
 other; however unknown the manner of
 such occupancy may be to us.

The possibility of the fact, I cannot but
 think father Boscovich, in the very words
 our

* Locke Hum. Und. b. 2, ch. 23. s. 12. † Ib. p. 21.

Our author has quoted from him, demonstrates. " Provided that any body move
 " with a sufficient degree of velocity, or
 " have sufficient degree of momentum to
 " overcome any powers of repulsion, that
 " it may meet with, it will find no diffi-
 " culty in making its way through any bo-
 " dy whatever: for * *nothing will interfere*
 " *or penetrate one another*, but powers such
 " as we know do in fact exist in the same
 " place, and counterbalance or over-rule
 " one another. If the momentum of such
 " a body in motion be sufficiently great,
 " Mr. Boscovich *demonstrates*, that the par-
 " ticles of any body, through which it
 " passes, will not even be moved out of
 " their place by it." Now, if one body,
 by mere rapidity of motion, can pervade
 another body, without moving the particles
 of it out of their place: may we not *a for-*
tiori maintain, that the momentum, with
 which the mind moves, may be equal to
 such

* The words are transcribed from Dr. Priestley.

such efficiency? I urge not this argument as demonstrative of the nature of the mind's operations on body; but as an instance of what the incomprehensible powers of velocity may effect.

SECTION II.

Concerning the Seat of the sentient Principle in man, and the difficulties that attend its supposed immateriality, from its sympathy with the body,

THE liberal author, having conferred on matter the powers of attraction and repulsion, supposes he has therein imparted to it a capability of sensation, perception, and thought: though these powers are as different from the other, as they are from absolute inertion. And having, without proof, imparted to it a *capability* of perception and thought, he, without reason,

son, puts it in actual possession of them. The perceptive faculties in man thus degraded, to a level with his material frame, of which they are affirmed to contribute a part; our author very properly proceeds to investigate in what part they reside. Materialists, however agreed in placing them in *some* corner of the human frame, cannot so easily agree upon the spot. Some place them in the orifice of the stomach, some in the heart; others again in the brain, in the membranes, the *septum lucidum*, and, not to pass over the conarion, or pineal gland of Descartes, some place it in the whole body. Our author has thought fit to fix its residence in the brain. "Had we," says he, "formed
" a judgment concerning the necessary seat
" of thought, by the circumstances that
" universally accompany it, which is our
" rule in all other cases, we could not but
" have concluded, that in man it is a pro-
" perty of the nervous system, or rather
of

“ of the brain.* Because, as far as we
“ can judge, the faculty of thinking, and a
“ certain state of the brain, always accom-
“ pany and correspond to one another. And
“ there is no instance of any man retaining
“ the faculty of thinking, when his brain
“ was *destroyed*; and whenever that faculty
“ is impeded or injured there is sufficient
“ reason to believe the brain is disordered
“ in proportion.”† Now this reason, were
the facts stated strictly true, would deserve
serious consideration: but I am sorry so flat-
ly to contradict the author, as in asserting
that they are absolutely false. He is per-
fectly safe in affirming, that no man ever re-
tained the faculty of thinking, when his
brain was *destroyed*. No, nor after his head
had been cut off. Is he such a stranger to the
structure of the human frame, as to suppose a
man can survive the *destruction* of his brain?
But that the brain is disordered, whenever
the

* Disq. p. 27.

† Disq. p. 27.

the faculty of thinking is impeded and impaired, is not true. I say, it is not true, because anatomical experiments prove it to be otherwise. The brain of idiots, melancholy, and mad persons, unless affected by fevers or other diseases that have no reference to insanity, has on the nicest inspection been found as free from disorder and imperfection of any kind, as any other part of the body. The author will not say, that the minute particles may be disarranged, though such disorder be not discernible by the eye: for though it may be so, he can not prove it is so; and no one will accept his hypotheses for proofs.

If between the faculty of thinking and the brain there was so close a connection as our Author supposes; and, whenever that faculty is impeded or injured, the brain is proportionably disordered: it must follow, that whenever the brain is disordered or injured, the faculty of thinking will be impeded

peded or injured too. And this must be universally the case. But the fact is so far otherwise: that surgeons of the first eminence have assured me, they have in the course of practice known instances where the brain has not only suffered injuries, but even a considerable diminution: and the persons after the loss of part of the brain, have possessed their intellectual faculties in as great vigour as ever. Now, could I conceive it possible, that a few senseless particles of common dust, by some particular and nice arrangement, should become necessarily invested with the powers of sensation, perception, and thought: I must also believe, that those particles, in themselves, possessing nothing like those intellectual faculties, derive them entirely from the niceness of their arrangement; and of course conclude, that an arrangement so nice, suffering the least disorder, those faculties must suffer too.

And

And even was this invariably the case; as often as the brain was injured, were the operations of the mind in some degree impeded; no conclusive argument could from hence be deduced in proof of its materiality. For when we consider the wonderful delicacy of the structure of the brain, from whence arise the nerves; each fibre of which is supposed to answer to a particular part of the brain at one end, and at its other end, to a particular part of the body: add to this, the infinite number of those small secretory organs, that strain or filtre the mass of blood, carried to them by numerous ducts, and separate from it an excessively fine and subtle fluid, denominated the animal spirits; and we can not be surprised at the very high degree of sensibility it possesses. A violent blow on the head will affect the whole system of organization: the tongue will not be able to articulate, nor the hand, nor the leg to move. And no wonder, if the mind which informs that system of organization
which

which is fitted to it, when the organs of sense, the outlets through which she directs her operations, are injured, be in her exertions impeded. But where only one organ of sense is hurt or destroyed, as for instance, the eye, or ear; the mind, as a principle distinct from the body, and exerting itself through every organ of sense, obstructed in its movements on one part, exerts itself with additional power on another. When a person is deprived of sight, his ear becomes more nice in the discrimination of sounds. And in deaf people, the mind is more particularly buried on the optic organs. In sleep, when every organ of sense is locked up: the mind is still active; impels the tongue to speak, the hands to fight, and the legs to run; though this temporary death withhold them from obedience to its impulse.

Now when the members of the body suffer such a total ligation in sleep, had the
perceptive

perceptive faculties been dormant too, this single circumstance would have afforded a more powerful argument in favour of the homogeneity of the soul and body, than any our author has advanced. And as the contrary is the fact, as the mind is alert, and the imagination, though wild, is strong; when the body is in a state of torpidity, and all its organs are bound up in the fetters of sleep: that they are distinct principles, and of different natures, is the first consideration that the phænomenon of dreaming excites. "That a man," says my author, "does not think during sleep, except in that imperfect manner which we call dreaming, and which is nothing more than an approach to a state of vigilance, I shall not here dispute, but take for granted: referring my readers to Mr. Locke and other writers upon that subject." * *The act of thinking during sleep,* which my acute author very justly observes, is

* Disq. p. 36

is no more than *what we call dreaming*, is a strong impediment in the way of the materialist; and I congratulate him upon his short and easy method of removing it. But *taking things for granted*, without disputing about them, short as the mode of arguing may be, is not always convincing; and has it inconveniences too. For instance, had our author contented himself *with taking for granted*, that the soul of man was a piece of mere mechanism, without troubling himself *to dispute* about it; who would not say, society had sustained a sensible loss?

Well; I am referred to Mr. Locke, and what says he? Why truly; "that the dreams
" of sleeping men are *all* made up of the
" waking man's ideas, oddly put together."
" ther."† If Mr. Locke intend the same reflection, that is conveyed in the following lines of Lucretius, it must be acknowledged

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that

† Book II. chap. 1.

that the poet hath expressed himself with much greater truth and accuracy than the philosopher.

Et quod quisque fere studio devinctus adhæret,
In somnis eadem *plerumque* videmur obire;
Causidici causas agere, et componere leges;
Induperatores pugnare, ac prælia obire;
Nautæ contractum cum ventis cernere bellum.

Lib. iv. v. 959.

The poet says *plerumque* the philosopher says *all*. A variety of dreams stand on record in direct contradiction of this general assertion: and many instances the experience of most men might produce of dreams, which bore no allusion to their waking thoughts. Plutarch and Cicero have not been afraid to mention dreams, as presagements of future events: but in an age, where a man against the clearest conviction of unprejudiced reason must doubt of every thing, to maintain the port of a philosopher; and with sceptic cautiousness

cautioufness embrace absurdities, rather than believe a truth; presagient dreams must, with the tales of goblins and fairies, be left to the peaceful possession of old women and children.

If Mr. Locke mean that the dreams of sleeping men are made up of the simple ideas, that were acquired when they were awake, he advances nothing. No man doubts it; no man ever supposed the mind to acquire new ideas at a time, when all the organs of sense are bound up by sleep. But that train of ideas, on which the sleeping man is employed, frequently bears no more analogy to the thoughts of that man when awake, than to those of any other man possessed of the same stock of simple ideas.

The ideas are *cddly put together*, not from any impotence or defect of the mind; but because the ligation of the organs of sense

restrains the mind from exercising her powers in the arrangement of them: and while it is united with the body, it must observe the laws of the body.

From the preceding reflection it will appear, that the powers of the mind would be then most vigorous, when the organization of the body, which it animated, was most compleat. And if the perfect state and free exertion of the organs of sense be so necessary to the perfect operations of the mind, our author will be found, with some reason, to infer, that “without just such a body as we have, it is *difficult* (for I will not call it *impossible*) to conceive how the mind could have become possessed of any of its present stock of ideas.”* But shall we therefore infer, that “without a body, we could have had no ideas at all.” This is however his inference, and in his own words. Because, in

* Disq. p. 34.

in this confined state of the soul, the organs of sense are acknowledged to be the outlets, through which the mind exerts her operations; does it follow, that, enlarged from its confinement, it cannot act at all? This would be to suppose, the soul derived her operations, not from her union with matter, but from matter itself. Whereas, if it have the power of action, when united with a dead substance, it may surely have a power of acting, when separated from it. For matter, in its own nature inert, cannot give more than it possesses: it may impede the operations of the mind, but cannot possibly cause them.

The soul, vitally united with the body, sees through the eye, as through a window; and freed from its confinement, it rests upon the author to prove, that it may not command a larger field of observation. It rests on him to demonstrate why, divested
of

of the body, it may not retain those ideas it had received from the organs of sense during its connection with the body; or why it may not receive other ideas, suited to the state of existence it may after death enjoy. I see no reason why both these suppositions may not be true; why the soul may not after death retain its old impressions; and also receive additional, more refined, and enlarged ones.

And such retention, in a disembodied state, of the former ideas which the soul during its connection with the body had acquired, is strongly countenanced by its operations in sleep; when it apparently receives as little assistance from the organs of sense, as it can be supposed to do in an actual deprivation of them. Locked up as they are by the influence of this temporary death, insensible of the soul's impressions, and unable to answer its motions, it is notwithstanding

standing busied on the ideas it had already acquired, sees, when the eye is closed, and converses without the aid of either ear or tongue.

Præterea molli somno cum dedita membra,

Effusumque jacet sine sensu corpus onustum :

Est aliud tamen in nobis, quod tempore in illo

Multimodis agitur ; et omneis accipit in se

Lætitie motus, et curas cordis inaneis.

Lucr. l. 3. v. 113.

In fine, to deny the possibility of such a sympathy between two principles, distinct and different as the soul and body are supposed to be, is, in the words of Mr. Locke, “to be sure without proofs, and to know without perceiving.”

Our author hath in vain endeavoured to vest in matter the powers of attraction and repulsion: as to the more noble powers of sense and cogitation, that they are inherent in it, or that matter in itself possesses any quality

quality that has an apparent approach to them, he has not attempted to prove : and therefore, if God had not called into existence, an order of immaterial beings, which we call souls, endowed with properties, very different from those of matter, and yet vitably unitable with matter ; I cannot see, how it is possible, without a miracle, for any modification of particles of matter, devoid of perception, or the most distant approach to it, to acquire powers so different from what are observable in matter, as sense and cogitation ; and that in so high a degree, as the faculties of the human mind discover.

SECTION III.

Of the supposed Advantages attending the System of Materialism.

WHATEVER regards another world, is particularly important, and universally interesting: and the effects of any doctrine, that bears a relation to the nature and properties of the soul, and its existence or non-existence in a future state, cannot be indifferent. Our author presumes the advantages attending the doctrine of the soul's materiality, to be various and great: I will attend him in his enumeration of them. *We thereby, says he, get rid of a great number of difficulties, which exceedingly clog and embarrass the opposite system; such, for instance, as these, What becomes of*
the

*the soul during sleep, in a swoon, when the body is seemingly dead, and especially after death? What was the condition of it before it became united to the body, and at what time did that union take place? &c. &c. &c.**

These Gordian difficulties, he solves in a manner truly Alexandrian, by a single dash of the pen, as the hero did his knots by a stroke of the sword; by denying that there is a soul.

But as he appears to have made little advance towards a demonstration of the non-entity of the soul, the solution of those difficulties still remains conjectural: and the nature of them is such, that, if not solved satisfactorily, they will make no good man unhappy; nor will any solution of them, except our author's, tend to corrupt his morals.

That

* Disq. p. 41

That the soul in sleep, is sometimes active, our dreams place beyond a doubt: that it is always active, cannot, perhaps, be proved; and the negative, I am sure, cannot be demonstrated. That we do not always remember the subjects on which the mind was employed, is not sufficient proof, that it does not always think. The soul, from that intimate union with the body, which we feel and perceive, must sympathise with it in its infirmities. While confined to the body, and exerting its powers through the organs of sense, it must, in some degree, obey the laws of the body.

Let us for a moment suppose, what is contended for, that the soul is immaterial, a principle distinct and different from the body: and it will, I think, follow, that the organization of the body, which is fitted to answer the motions of the soul, and through which it exerts its operations, will,
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in the best and most perfect manner, answer those motions, when the several organs are most in order, and in their perfect vigour. If this be the case, in manhood and health the operations of the mind will be most vigorous. The organs of sense, in infancy weak, and debilitated by old age, will impede and restrain the free and vigorous exertions of the soul. In swoons, where the bodily organs are least vigorous, and locked up, as it were, in a state of torpitude, the mind must necessarily make the faintest impressions, and those impressions be the most feebly retained. Admitting then the soul's immateriality, since these consequences must result from its intimate union with the body, they cannot, with any pretence of reason, be produced, as arguments against the truth of such a doctrine. If the nice organization of the body, when disarranged, did *not* affect the operations of the mind; it might act

act in any other parcel of matter, as well as that.

It happens, however, that there are instances of men, whose intellectual faculties, in extreme old age, and even at the threshold of the grave, have remained in as full vigour, as in any period of their lives. Whether these instances may be attributed to an uncommon strength of mind, to a habit of singular temperance, whereby the organization of the body is less liable to be disarranged; or to a freedom from passions, that *apathy*, to which Stoicism aspired, and Cato, who is said to have possessed his intellectual powers even to death, is also reported nearly to have attained; it is besides my present purpose to enquire. That many such instances may be produced, is an undeniable fact. And one single instance defeats the argument against the immateriality of the soul, deduced from its sympathy with the body, under the infirmities

ties of old age. In a regular and gradual decay, such as is brought on by old age, all the organs of the body are in some measure impaired: and if, in this general decay of the body, the mind be strong and active, and vigorous as ever; the conclusion is, that the mind, however closely united with the body, must be a principle distinct from, and independent of it.

The doubt concerning the state of the soul after death, is indeed gloriously got rid of, by the comfortable assurance of its annihilation: a doctrine this, as my author well observes, very favourable to the soul-sleepers; “for the notion of an immaterial substance passing thousands of years without a single idea or sensation, approaches very nearly to the notion of no substance at all.” But this part of his theory shall be more particularly examined hereafter: in the meantime, I leave the
Psyche-

Psychopannychists to express their obligations to him for the singular service his labours may do their cause.

The difficulty also of conceiving, *what was the condition of the soul before it became united to the body, and, at what time that union took place, with two or three et ceteras,* are all cleared up, and every doubt relating to the soul resolved, only by striking its existence out of question. And are these the advantages for which I am to exchange a soul, and submit my mind to the horrors of annihilation? Indeed they tend as little to lure me to with our author's doctrine true, as his arguments do, to convince me that it is so.

But these it seems are not all the difficulties that attend the doctrine of the soul's existence: for in the next page, in a strain of irony, he asks, whether "the Divine Power must be necessarily employed to produce a soul,
" whenever

“ whenever the human species copulate ; or
“ some pre-existent spirit be obliged to in-
“ habit the new-formed embryo ?” * Now
really I did not know, that either soul or
body was produced as often as the human
species copulated. But if, in the course of
our author’s profound investigations, he hath
been happy enough to discover an arcanum,
whereby the production of a body shall be
the sure consequence of the copulation of
the human species ; so greatly must such a
discovery conduce to population, his Majesty
will without doubt amply remunerate him for
making it public. And indeed, exclusive of
all reward, to make known a secret of so
great importance, is a duty he owes society,
as the best compensation for the injury he
hath, in the publication now under my eye,
attempted against it.

At the author’s pleasantries concerning the
human species, we may smile ; but to hear
him

* Disquisitions, p. 42.

him express himself so freely of the divine nature, and the operations of the Deity, as he is apt sometimes to do, is less entertaining. When he ascribes a kind of labour and *employment*, in the production of a soul, to that Omnipotent Being, who can at a word call a world out of nothing, and at another reduce it to nothing again; it is an application of language, which philosophy does not countenance.

The last advantage, which our author ascribes to his system, and which I will not in silence pass by, lies in his compendious disposal of the souls of brutes: the state of which after death would else, he thinks, be found more embarrassing, than that of human beings. His solicitude on this subject is so great, that one would scarcely think it was the bare *knowledge* of what would after death become of them, which could so trouble him; but that he was to be burthened

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with the actual disposal of them. "If
" man," says he, " be actuated by a prin-
" ciple distinct from his body, every brute
" animal must have an immaterial soul also;
" for they differ from us in degree only,
" and not at all in kind; having all the
" same mental as well as corporeal powers
" and faculties that we have, though not
" in the same extent: and they are possessed
" of them in a greater degree than those of
" our race that are idiots, or that die in-
" fants." * Well, be it so: I thank God
for such a degree of benevolence, as to wish
every animal being a future state of exist-
ence. And if the justice and goodness of
the Deity afford me an argument in proof
of the supposition, that every being suscep-
tible of pleasure and pain shall partake of
another state, in which their sufferings,
which appear often to exceed their pleasures
in this, shall be recompensed; it neither
moves

* Disq. p. 42

moves my envy, nor renders the immortality of the soul a less desirable object of hope. Nor do I arrogantly ask, whether they are “naturally and originally the same” beings with the souls of men; whether “they pre-existed, and are to continue for ever; or how or where their infinitely great and good Maker will after death dispose of them.” I will not trouble the public with my own reveries on that subject: but if an argument can be conceived, which affords a gleam of hope that they will hereafter exist, I gladly embrace it; well assured, that their future existence must be productive of their future happiness.

After enumerating all those *difficulties*, great and important difficulties, that embarrass the doctrine of immaterialism, and of which our author hath discovered a compendious way to rid himself, he triumphantly exclaims, “None of those difficulties,

“ or rather absurdities, clog our simpler
 “ system. Man, according to it, is no
 “ more, than what we now see of him.” *
 His whole existence is confined between the
 cradle and the grave; and when he quits
 this vale of misery, his being is at an end.
 The stings of conscience no longer torture
 the villain; and the worthy mind, with all
 its virtuous habits, rots with the body in
 the grave. Comfortable reflection this to
 the unprincipled profligate! But how shock-
 ing to him, whose hope, whose confidence,
 grounded on the words of an apostle, is,
that when he departs hence, he shall be with
Christ!

“ His being,” continues our author, “ com-
 “ mences at the time of his conception,
 “ or *perhaps at an earlier period.*” I
 have been long considering at what earlier
 date, than that of his conception, this au-
 thor can, upon his own principles, place the
 the

* Disq. p. 49.

the commencement of his being. From such an insinuation, one might be led to suspect, that he is laughing at his serious reader, that the apparent drift of his performance is ironical, and he himself a real advocate for pre-existence. Or does he refer to man's existence in the loins of his father? If so, by extending the idea, he may derive, if he please, the commencement of his own existence from Adam, or perhaps from a more distant date; from that infinite series of human bodies, that swell the circle of eternity. "The corporeal and mental faculties," adds he, "inhering in the same substance, grow, ripen, and decay together; and whenever the system is dissolved, it continues in a state of dissolution, till it shall please that Almighty Being, who called it into existence, *to restore it to life again:*" With strictest propriety the author might have said, *to create it again*; for the whole structure, soul and body, being reduced to a parcel of incoherent

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rent particles of dust, returns to the very same state in which it lay before its organization. There is no restoration of the soul to the body; but if the man could ever be properly said to have a creation since the first creation of matter, his future organization becomes a new, real, and as absolute a creation as the other.

Our author, having deprived matter of one * property, which generally has been adjudged essential to it, and conferred on it two others, which, *to wipe away its reproach*, he

* Our author is a little inconsistent with himself in denying solidity to matter, while he acknowledges a single nutshell full of solid matter in the whole solar system: for upon that concession, though we may exclaim with the poet, in a sense more literal than he intended,

— O quantum est in rebus inane,

we must acknowledge, that every portion of matter existing in the universe, however expanded, will contain a degree of solid matter, proportionate to it in its compressed state.

files

stiles powers, annihilated the soul, and substituted matter, so exalted, in its stead ; as if he had not done sufficient honour to King Log, makes him his god, and invests him with omnipotence. On this subject, however, he seems to proceed with a degree of caution : and if he acted consistently with his professions, a subject on which the philosopher so well and so truly expressed himself, when he declared, “ The more he
 “ thought on it, the less of it he knew,” the essence of the Deity would have escaped his investigation. “ It must,” says he, “ be
 “ confessed with awful reverence, that we
 “ know but little of *ourselves*, and therefore
 “ much less of our *Maker*, even with respect
 “ to his attributes. We know but little of
 “ the *works* of God, and therefore certainly
 “ much less of his *essence*.”* Now could we after this profession conceive, that the author would immediately turn his pen to
 an

* Disq. p. 104.

an investigation of the divine essence, and at last materialize the deity ?

“ If,” says he, “ by the term *immaterial* we simply mean to denote a substance, “ that has properties and powers essentially “ different from those of *created* matter, I “ have no objection to the term.” * Why is this word *created* foisted in ? Does the author mean to distinguish between created and uncreated matter ? If so, what is the difference ? If not, and by *immaterial* he means to denote a substance, the properties and powers of which are essentially different from matter, our dispute in this period of the controversy is at an end : and if he can find a better term, whereby to express such his meaning, than an immaterial substance or spirit ; from so respectable authority I shall be happy to adopt it. But it is plain, that this is not his idea of an immaterial substance ;

* Disq. p. 108.

substance; for, according to his notion, the divine Being is a substance, that must necessarily possess some properties of matter: because, according to his assertion, that Omnipotent Being could not otherwise *possibly* act upon matter. Now, whatever possesses the properties of matter, is, in a degree proportionate to those properties, material. The author, therefore, supposes the Deity in some degree material: how far so, he has not thought fit directly to instruct us. He has, however, employed a whole chapter in informing us, that the materiality of the Deity is the undoubted doctrine of the scriptures.

Reflections

SECTION IV.

Reflections on the Nature of the Divine Essence, according to the Scriptures.

THAT He, who created, must necessarily be of essence different, and of a nature, very superiour to that which he had created, is one of the first and most obvious considerations, that occur to a mind employed on that most elevated subject, the nature and essence of the Deity. But to conceive what that essence is, and wherein that superiority of nature consists, must necessarily transcend powers so comparatively low, as those of the human mind. And, under whatever scriptural authorities our author may attempt to shelter the boldness of his opinions, in the scriptures we find nothing determinate about them. On the contrary, we there meet with repeated assertions of the incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature. *Can we, by searching, find out*

out God, says the sublime author of the book of Job : *Can we find out the Almighty unto Perfection ?*

Immaterial is not a term definitive of the divine Essence: we use it only to denote something essentially different from matter. But to suppose, with our author, that “ had “ the Deity been an immaterial substance, “ his immateriality would have been as “ strongly and frequently inculcated in the “ scriptures, as we find the doctrine of the “ unity of his nature to be ; * is to suppose, that immateriality is as explicative of the essence of the Deity, and as intelligible by us, as his unity. Whereas, of the one we can form a very exact idea ; of the other, no idea at all.

But though the scriptures do not inculcate the immateriality of the Deity, as explicative

* Disq. p. 134.

plicative of the divine Essence ; yet they seem as strongly to guard against the imputation of materialism, in respect to him, as against polytheism. *God*, saith our Lord himself, *is a spirit*. Now, what idea he meant to convey under the term *spirit*, we may collect from another passage, in which he observes to his disciples, *a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have*. *Spirit*, like *immaterial substance*, is a negative term : it characterizes something as not material.

God is a Spirit, says our Saviour : yet, our author asserts, “ There is in this passage, no reference whatever to the immateriality of the divine nature.” But, does not our Saviour use the word *πνευμα*, as in the last sentence has been observed, in a sense significant of something that is not matter. *Handle me, and feel*, and satisfy yourselves : for a spirit would not resist the touch ; *it*
hath

hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have. And why are we not to annex to the same word, as used by him in this, as well as the last passage, the same idea? Or, how does our author support his assertion? Why, truly by the authority of another assertion; viz. "That
 " this very passage, apparently so direct and
 " absolute against the corporeity of the
 " deity, is alledged by *some* of the fathers,
 " as an argument for the corporeity of the
 " divine nature." I shall here take occasion to make one general observation on the looseness of our author's quotations; which might induce a scrupulous reader often to question the authenticity of them. One would wish to know, in *which* of the fathers, and in what part of his works, so very extraordinary an argument is produced; and in what manner it is supported. But no such satisfaction is afforded: the author has asserted, that it is so: and you may believe him, or let it alone. With equal
 success

Success, that same father, or this same author for him, might alledge the ejaculation of St. Stephen, *Lord Jesus receive my spirit*, as an argument for the corporeity of the soul. The passage is worth our Author's observation; and I leave him to make his reflections on it.

As my Author is now ransacking the scriptures in support of his doctrine, I beg leave to step a little out of the way of our present enquiry, in vindication of an assertion of the learned and intelligent *author of the religion of nature*, on the authority of an apostle. That able writer deserved too well of mankind, to pass unnoticed by an author so zealous as our disquisitor,

‘ *In semet legem sancire iniquam.*’

even the mortifying law of annihilation. “It is plain”, says Mr. Wollaston, “there are two different interests in man, on the one
“ one

“ one side reason, on the other passion,
 “ which, being many times directly oppo-
 “ site, must belong to different subjects.
 “ There are upon many occasions contests,
 “ and as it were wars between the mind
 “ and the body: so far are they from being
 “ the same thing.”

To this our Author answers, “ the passions
 “ themselves are more evidently at variance,
 “ than passion and reason; and therefore,
 “ by the same argument, ought to be re-
 “ ferred to different substances in the hu-
 “ man constitution. If Mr. Wollaston
 “ meant to refer the passions to the body,
 “ there will be some danger, least desire,
 “ will, and other faculties, always acknow-
 “ ledged to be mental, should go in with
 “ them: and so, before he is aware of it,
 “ the whole man will be material, there
 “ being nothing left to belong to, or con-
 “ stitute the immaterial soul.”

This

This I humbly conceive to be a very frivolous answer to a very just observation. I presume Mr. Wollaston never meant to refer the passions to the body. Notwithstanding which, between the mad impetuosity of passion, and the acts of reason, he must be more or less than man, who does not see and feel a manifest and essential difference: The passions act with a kind of impulse, to which, perhaps the epithet of *instinctive* may not be improperly applied; always driving at one point, taking full possession of the body, and wholly subserving its interests: the lip trembles. the eye sparkles, and the heart is contracted or dilated, according to the nature of the acting passion. While on the other hand, reason, as a principle distinct from and absolutely independent of the body, examines things in their remotest consequences, compares, and judges; exerting her operations on the body no otherwise, than by influencing the will.

St.

St. Paul, Heb. vii. 23, describes *the law in his members, as warring against the law of his mind*. And again, Gal. v. 17, he expresses himself still more strongly concerning the two distinct interests in man. *The flesh, says he, lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary the one to the other*. The unprejudiced reader, who will compare the passages of St. Paul, with that above cited from Mr. Wollaston, will conclude that the observation of the apostle must fare poorly at his hand, who holds that of the philosopher to be unjust. They both describe two different interests, and those different interests or principles as frequently clashing against each other: the passions and affections, excited by temporal objects, pleading for gratification, against the higher and nobler powers of the soul; and raising a kind of civil war in the man,

F

Now

Either the flesh is in those passages represented by St. Paul, as lusting against something that is not flesh; or it is represented as lusting against itself. But flesh and spirit appear in this place to be put in direct opposition to each other: for if no more was meant, than a kind of combat between good and evil inclinations, I see not, upon the supposition, that the whole man is corporeal, why the one should be called flesh, any more than the other.

The immateriality of the Deity, it hath been already observed, is not explicative of the divine nature and essence; but, as a term negative of matter, it may be inferred from the prohibitions in the second commandment, as his unity is from that of the first: “Thou shalt not make to thyself
“any graven image, nor any likeness of
“what is in heaven above, or that is in the
“earth beneath, or that is in the water un-
“der

“der the earth.” That is, thou shalt worship God under no similitude, no form whatever. The expression is full and emphatical, and excludes all notion of the Deity, under any form whatever. But form being essential to matter, this prohibition, which excludes form from our conceptions of the Deity, excludes all matter too.

There was, in the third century, a sect of Christians exemplary for austerity of life and purity of manners; good men, though, as their doctrines proved them, no very acute philosophers. The Heresiarch was Audeus; and his followers were, from him, called Audeans; and sometimes, from their tenets, Anthropomorphites. They held, that the Deity was corporeal: and, what may hurt our author’s vanity, grounded the truth of their doctrines on those very texts of scripture, which he himself has in proof

of the same opinion alledged. I do not, from this observation, presume to insinuate, that my author is not a very acute philosopher: but, that my representation of the fact is just, the following quotations evince.

“ We often find,” says this author, “ the
 “ *presence of the Lord* mentioned, as if there
 “ was upon earth some place where he particularly resided, or which he frequented.
 “ One instance of this we have in the antediluvian history. Cain says, Gen. iv. 12.
 “ *Behold, thou hast driven me out this day from the face of the earth, and from thy face shall I be hid.* Again, ver. 16. *And Cain went out from the presence of the Lord.*” * Surely it would be an affront to our author’s understanding, to inform him, that, by *the face* of the Lord is plainly signified his favour and protection; and that,
 by

* Disq. p. 135.

by going out *from the presence of the Lord*, is also meant, his going as an outcast from the land assigned to Adam, cut off from the immediate protection of God, and those frequent communications he enjoyed with him, through his messenger or angel. Yet, if he did so understand these passages, what is his drift in the quotation? Is it to insinuate, that the people, for whose information Moses wrote them, did not understand them in this light. If they did not, I am sure, it argued a very great defect in their comprehension: as well as very little acquaintance with the idiom of their own language.

Again, "At the building of the Tower of Babel we read, Gen. xi. 5. *And God came down to see the city, and the tower which the children of men builded.*" * From the purpose, for which our author produces this quotation, would one not imagine, that the

* Disq. p. 135.

the Jews, from this passage, were taught to believe, that God, like Homer's Jupiter, sprung from his throne, made a trip to the earth, and there took an ocular survey of the tower of Babel?

The following passages I transcribe in the order in which they are quoted by the author. "Ex. iii. 4. *The Angel of the Lord appeared to him in a flame of fire, out of the midst of the bush.* Chap. v. 4. *And when the Lord saw that he turned aside to see, God called to him out of the bush, and said, I am the-God of thy Fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.* Ex. xiii. 21. *And the Lord went before them by day in a pillar of a cloud, to lead them the way; and by night in a pillar of fire, to give them light.* Ver. 24. *The Lord looked upon the host of the Egyptians, and troubled them.* Ex. xix.

9.

“ 9, *And the Lord said unto Moses, lo I come*
 “ *unto thee in a thick cloud, that the people may*
 “ *hear when I speak with thee, and may be-*
 “ *lieve thee for ever. Ex. xxiv. 9, then went*
 “ *Moses and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu,*
 “ *and seventy of the elders of Israel, and they*
 “ *saw the God of Israel, and there was under*
 “ *his feet as it were a paved work, of sapphire*
 “ *stone, and as it were the body of Heaven in*
 “ *its clearfulness; and upon the nobles of the*
 “ *children of Israel he laid not his hand; and they*
 “ *saw God, and did eat and drink. Ex. xxxiii,*
 “ *11, The Lord spake unto Moses face to face,*
 “ *as a man speaketh to his friend.”* To these
 passages our author hath added others of the
 same import; cited from the new, as well as
 the old testament. And many more, than
 he has cited, might be adduced in proof of
 what was never denied; that the deity is in
 the scriptures frequently represented in a
 material and bodily form; as having hands
 and eyes, and organs of speech.

From

From those scriptural expressions our author observes, “ if modern metaphysicians would
 “ attend a little to such passages of Scrip-
 “ ture as these, and consider what must
 “ have been the sentiments of the writers,
 “ and of those who were present at the
 “ scenes described in them; they would not
 “ be so much alarmed as they now are, or
 “ affect to be, at every thing like *materiality*
 “ ascribed to the Divine being.” Why so?
 Is there no difference between expressing
 ourselves, in respect to God, and his attri-
 butes, in terms figurative and comprehens-
 ible by the human understanding: and la-
 bouring by abstruse, and metaphysical, in-
 vestigations, to reduce the Creator in point
 of essence to an approaching level with his
 creatures, and to degrade that most perfect
 and infinitely sublime intelligence, by ascrib-
 ing to him *any* properties in common with
 matter? When God is represented as *a flame*
of fire, a pillar of fire, a pillar of darkness, and
 the

the like ; who knows not, that those representations were symbols and pledges of the divine favour, support and protection ; and sensible assurances to the persons, to whom they were made, that God was immediately with them.

That such was the meaning of the writer, and that he was very cautious in guarding such expressions from a literal interpretation, appears in many instances. In his warm and earnest admonition to the Jews to beware of idolatry, Deut. iv, 15, *Take, says he, good heed to yourselves (for ye saw no manner of similitude on the day the Lord spake to you in Hereb, out of the midst of the fire) lest ye corrupt yourselves, and make you a graven image, the similitude of any figure.* So when it is said, Ex. xxxiii, 11, *The Lord spake unto Moses face to face, as a man speaketh to his friend :* in the 20th verse of the same chapter God is represented as declaring to Moses,

Thou

Thou canst not see my face, for there shall no man see me, and live, 1 Tim. vi. 16, the Apostle affirms that *no man hath at any time seen God, or can see him.* And a greater authority than St. Paul hath declared, that no man had at any time heard the voice of God, or seen his shape. *

We cannot grossly conceive, that God hath organs of speech; but we know assuredly, that He, who gave the tongue of man to speak, can whenever for extraordinary purposes he sees good, and, whenever he pleases, form an audible voice; at his bidding, in the language of our Saviour, *the very stones will cry out.* When therefore God is said in scripture language to speak; the plain meaning is, that he caused a voice to be heard; and to urge this, and such like scriptural expressions, as proofs of the materiality of the divine nature, or as excuses for an

* Joh. v. 37.

an endeavour to prove it, convinces either a poverty of arguments, or a consciousness of temerity.

SECTION V.

General Arguments tending to evince the Immateriality of the Soul.

IT has been observed, * that the powers of imagination, when all the organs of sense were bound up by sleep, were active and vigorous: and therefore it was inferred, that the bodily organs, not obeying the impressions of the mind, impeded its regular operations, though it could not entirely obstruct the actions of a principle, independent of it. And if we extend this reflection to men in advanced age, the argument will

* Reflect. p. 36.

will receive additional strength. For, if perception was derived from a particular organization of matter, and became of course enfeebled and impaired with the decay of the body; such general decay and infirmity of the mind would be apparent in sleep, as well as when awake: that is, the operations of the perceptive faculty in sleep would be just as weak and languid in old people, as the powers of the arm exerted in sleep would be, or of any other member of the body. Whereas the mind is as vigorous in old men, when asleep, as in young ones: I believe, general experience proves it to be stronger. Old people generally dream more than young ones. The organs of sense in old persons, not so readily receiving and answering the impressions of the mind, when awake, the perceptive faculties are proportionably impeded; and from thence *appear* to be impaired: but in sleep, when the bodily organs, both in young and
old

old people, are quite bound up, the minds of both discover equal power and activity: they both receive greater impediments from the organs of sense, under the ligation of sleep, than under any infirmities of sickness or old age; and in that state, being on a footing of equality, their operations are equally vigorous.

The pains and pleasures of the mind afford another argument of its immateriality. Read of a great and generous action, and what an exalted pleasure does it communicate to it! And on the contrary, what pain to it doth the reading, the hearing, or the sight of a cruel or oppressive act create! And these causes act on the mind at a distance: Not as matter acts on matter, by immediate contact. Nor is the manner, in which the causes of pain operate on the mind and body, more different than the nature of the sensations. The laceration of
the

the body, the amputation of a limb, or a contusion on the head, all create a similar kind of pain, though, perhaps, different in degree. The difference of the sensations, caused by pains of mind, experience only can explain. Operations then, so essentially different as those described, and effects so different in their nature, must be attributed to causes equally different; such are material and immaterial principles.

Mr. Locke has supposed all our ideas to be derived from sensation and reflection. And by reflection he understands "the perception of the operations of the mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas *it has got.*" "This source of ideas," he adds, "may properly enough be called *internal sense.*"* And this doctrine has, upon so great an authority, generally prevailed. But false opinions
 fre.

* Locke, b. 2. ch. i. s. 4.

frequently pass current under the sanction of a great name, like base coin under that of the royal impression. When the mind is employed on immaterial substances, or that most sublime of all subjects, the Deity, can we say, *it is employed about ideas it has got* through the senses. Those ideas cannot be derived from sensation: they must either be derived from revelation originally, or they must be innate. It is very true, that we can form no adequate idea of the Divine Nature: but we have such ideas of it, as enable us to reason upon his perfections and attributes, and inspire love and veneration for him.

If all our ideas were derived from sensation and reflection, and by reflection was meant, no more than the operations of the mind, as employed about the ideas it had got; all our ideas must be excited and bounded by objects of sense: for we cannot
desire

desire things, of which we can form no ideas. And therefore, a full gratification of the senses would constitute a perfect satisfaction of the mind. But in such a state as this, when every passion is indulged, and every wish, the senses can suggest, gratified, the mind is as far as ever from enjoying a plenary satisfaction: it palls and sickens under an undescribable languor; which the Latins called the *tedium vite*; and the French term *ennui*: and for which our language, though we are no strangers to such kind of sensation, does not afford a name.

As nothing advanced by our author, in his reasonings against the immateriality of the soul, called forth in the course of this reply, those two or three general remarks, in support of the truth of it; I have thrown them together in a separate section, and cheerfully submit the weight of them to the
reader's

reader's judgment: unwilling to omit any suggestion in support of a doctrine, so comfortable in itself, and in its consequences so beneficial to society, as that of the immortality of the soul.

G

PART

PART II.

SECTION I.

*Reflections on the Principles of human Nature,
according to the Scriptures.*

OUR Author's Disquisitions on this part of his subject, comprehend two points; the nature of the human soul, and the state to which death reduces us. Revelation alone can direct us in this enquiry: and that he professes to consult and follow. But I am sorry to observe, that he seems to approach the sacred oracles, not with the unprejudiced mind, and open ingenuous disposition of a disciple; but with a system in his hand, to which he is determined to fit

them. His great object is, to invalidate the doctrine of an intermediate state. The texts of scripture he has for that purpose adduced, his interpretation of these texts, and his reasonings upon them, shall be attentively considered. Not that because I may dislike a general system, I hold myself, therefore, obliged to cavil at every tenet contained in it : but the truth of that doctrine I warmly hope, and firmly believe ; and as the contrary opinion hath obtained a degree of credit, under the authority of a very respectable character of the present age, I shall be particular in my examination of it,

The first passage he cites from scripture, is " Gen. ii. 7. *And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul.*" " We see here," says our author, that the *whole man* (for nothing is said of the body in particular)

" was

“ was made of the dust of the ground. No
 “ part of him is said to have had a higher or
 “ different original.” Now, really to *vulgar*
 apprehensions, (which our author hath already treated with a proper contempt; but as he ranked Mr. Locke’s in that class, no one will be ashamed to stand on the same ground) the passage doth really appear declarative of the very reverse of what this author asserts. It declares as absolutely as the power of language can express it; that the *whole active being*, commonly stiled man; was not made of the dust of the ground: but that a part of him had a higher and different original.

God moulded the dust of the ground into the shape and substance of man; or, in the words of Moses, *God formed man of the dust of the ground*. The word אדם man, in this place signifies the visible form and substance
 of

of man, the human body only : * for the soul was not yet created. The production of the soul was the effect of another operation. It was not till God had breathed into his nostrils the spirit of life, that this inert mass of matter, bearing the form of man, became an animated intellectual being, a living intelligence or soul.

“ When the Almighty Author of nature,
 “ says Philo,’ having finished the crea-
 “ tion of the heaven, the earth, and the
 “ middle elements, made man : he is said
 “ to have breathed into his mouth the spirit
 “ of life, and that he became a soul of life :
 “ *the scripture thereby instructing us, that*
 “ *spirit was the essence of the soul.*” † It is
 very

* אדם quia fuit creatus ; עפר מן האדמה pul-
 vis ex terra. Buxtorf.

† Οωστε δε πρωτον μετα την Ουρανου,
 και γης, και των μεταξυ γενεσιν, εδημιουργει
 ανθρω-

very plain, from the short account, which Moses has given us of the formation of man, that he did not derive even animation from any particular modification of matter : much less can we ascribe it to his perceptive faculties. And such the passage above cited from Philo, shews to have been his opinion.

The author says, “ it is absurd to suppose, “ the dust of the earth could be converted into “ an immaterial soul.” There is no occasion to suppose any such thing : surely the historian, without supposing the conversion of matter into spirit, may be allowed to say, the human frame, endowed with a principle of life

ανθρωπον ὁ ζωοπλαστής, φησιν, ενεφυσησεν
εις το προσωπον αυτε πνευμα ζωής, ἃ εγενε-
το εις ψυχην ζωης· παλαι δια τετε πα-
ριστας, οτι πνευμα εστιν ἡ ψυχης οσια.

Phil. Jud. περι του το χειρ. τω κρειτ. φιλ. επ.
Ed. Par. p. 115.

life and perception, became a living soul. In this, as in many other parts of scripture, the word soul, as our author has observed, is used for the whole man. The dust of the earth remained, moulded by the plastic hand of the Almighty Creator into the form and substance of man; and, after having been animated with the breath of God, became, in consequence of that new connexion, a living perfect man. *

More frivolous is his next remark: Gen. xlv. 26. *All the souls, that came with Jacob into Egypt, which came out of his loins.* “The immaterial principle, ‘shrewdly observes our author,’ certainly could not come from his loins.” Here we are entirely agreed: the perceptive faculty, which, from my ignorance of its real nature, I call an

* Ανθρωπου δε ψυχην ονομαζει ανθρωπον.

Phil. Jud. edit. Par. p. 116.

an immaterial principle, could no more come from his loins, than from his finger nails; it could not be the production of gross matter. From such a remark one might be led to suppose, Moses was writing a philosophical treatise on the principles of human nature; and not a history of the first ages of the world, accommodated to the understanding of an illiterate people, and conveyed in familiar terms.

That the word *soul* is often used for the whole man, has been already granted; there is no figure more frequent in Scripture than the synecdoche. And if the author can make any use of the concession, he is heartily welcome to it. As the superior part of man, that which constituted the torpid mass of earth a living soul or man, it is frequently used for the whole man; and likewise, in a metaphorical and borrowed sense, for life, for breath, &c. but shall we therefore infer,
it

it has no proper signification? If we do, it is an inference, which no logic will justify, and which the scriptures directly contradict. Our Saviour himself represents it in contradistinction to the body, as a principle in its own nature unperishable, which *men can not kill.*

Having finished his critique on the word נפש, by which we have already seen how much he has gained: "Let us now, 'says
 " the author,' proceed to the account which
 " the scriptures give us of the mortality of
 " man, to see whether we can find in any
 " passage relating to this subject, some trace
 " of an immortal soul." Let him do so, with ever so little sincerity, and I'll engage, he will stumble upon it. "Death is first
 " threatened to man,' continues he, 'in
 " these terms, Gen. ii. 17. *Of the tree of
 " knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not
 " eat of it; for in the day that thou eatest of
 " it*

“ *it thou shalt surely die.* Here is no ex-
 “ ception made of any part of the man,
 “ that was not to die. The natural con-
 “ struction of the sentence imports, that
 “ whenever the decree should take place,
 “ whatever was alive belonging to man,
 “ would wholly cease to live, and become
 “ lifeless earth, as it had been originally.”
 Not quite so fast. Would our author write
 less rapidly; would he for a moment stop
 his pen, and without prejudice compare the
 denunciation of punishment, in consequence
 of sin, with the actual decree after the pe-
 nalty had been incurred; he would find,
 that the sentence of death extended only to a
 part of the man: the other part, therefore,
 is plainly excepted.

The penalty denounced was, *in the day*
that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.
 By death, I presume, was meant, a priva-
 tion of sense and motion. To prevent, how-
 ever,

ever, any dispute on this point, let us turn to the actual sentence of death passed upon Adam after his transgression, and we shall there find it clearly explained. Gen. iii.

19. *In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou returnest to the ground, for out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return.* This pas-

sage in scripture is quoted also by our author, like the preceding one, to shew, that

“ no exception is made of any part of the

“ man that was not to die. For, ‘ says

“ he,’ the same inference may be made from

“ the account of the actual sentence of death

“ passed upon him, that was drawn from

“ the threatening denounced.” He then

cites the decree, and remarks upon it:

“ If in this there be any allusion to an im-

“ material and immortal part in man, it is

“ wonderfully concealed.” If it be con-

cealed, ’tis, indeed, a *wonderful* conceal-

ment; ’tis only concealed from those *who*

have

have eyes, and will not see, or hearts which cannot understand.

Thou shalt return unto the ground, for out of it wast thou taken. The word *return* clearly denotes the subject of the sentence to have been once in that state, to which it was doomed. Nothing more, therefore, is included in the decree, than the terrene composition of which man was formed. The spirit, which God breathed into man, the spirit of life and perfection, was not from the ground, and of course, could not be said to *return* thither. It was not dust, and therefore cannot be included in that declaration, *dust thou art*: and no more is contained in the sentence, than was included in the declaration. *Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return.* Thou, that art dust, shalt return to dust. Now the dust returning to its original state: the soul, which is often called the spirit, we are naturally to suppose,

suppose, will also return to God, who gave it; to be disposed of by him accordingly as he shall decree. And this interpretation seems to have been supplied by the author of Ecclesiastes, ch. xii. 7. *Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was; and the spirit shall return unto God, who gave it.*

There appears to me a peculiar force in the latter part of that verse: *God gave it.* He formed man of the dust of the ground: but his soul or spirit proceeded immediately from God: He created and *gave it.* And to Him, *the Creator of spirits,* * it is not said, it shall go, or ascend, but it *shall return*: thereby implying from whence it first came; and distinguishing its origin from that of the corporeal or earthy part of man.

In Genesis, ch. vi. 3. God is represented as declaring, *my spirit shall not always*

* Heb. xii. 9.

ways * strive with man, for that *he also is flesh*. The meaning of the passage one would suppose, too obvious to be mistaken; viz. that he will no longer bear with the impurities and wickedness of the descendants of Adam; admonishing and trying them as he had done: seeing that they were of the same earthy base extraction with their progenitor; and therefore unworthy of his providential care. *My spirit shall not always strive with man, for that he also is flesh* [בשר]. "Here is no mention," remarks our author, "of any superior principle." Most certainly there is not. But to conclude from thence, that man has no superior principle, is a wild inference. We can not suppose that the materials, of which man was composed, were in that passage alluded to; but the grovling attachments, that bias his will; and rule, instead of subserve that ethereal spark, with which God animated the sordid mass.

*

"When

* The more exact translation is, *judge against man because*

“ When the flood took place, ‘ continues
“ the author,’ and almost the whole race of
“ mankind” was destroyed, there is still no
“ mention made of their immortal souls, or
“ what became of them.” It is undoubtedly
true : and I sincerely wish, for the gratifi-
cation of my own curiosity, that Moses had
left us a complete history of the intermedi-
ate state. But, because he has done no such
thing, because he has left us no sketch of
it, nor woven any account of it into his con-
cise history of the deluge ; to assert there is
no intermediate state, is a very hasty con-
clusion. Moses was writing a history of the
deluge ; and whether the souls of those
who perished in it, were mortal or immortal,
or whether he knew, or did not know, what
became of them ; any account of those mat-
ters would not fall naturally within the his-
torical detail he was there giving.

“ Lima, ‘ says an author on my table,’
“ continued in great splendour, until the
“ year

“ year 1747, when a most tremendous
 “ earthquake, which entirely devoured Cal-
 “ lao, the port belonging to it, laid three
 “ fourths of this city level with the ground.
 “ The destruction of Callao was the most
 “ perfect and terrible that can be conceived,
 “ no more than one of all the inhabitants
 “ escaping. The people ran from their
 “ houses in the utmost terror and confusion.
 “ He heard a cry of *miserere* rise from all
 “ parts of the city, and immediately all was
 “ silent. The sea had entirely overwhelm-
 “ ed it, and buried its inhabitants in its
 “ bosom.” Now in the account of this ca-
 lamitous flood or earthquake, call it which
 you please, not the least intimation is given
 of what became of the *immortal souls* of
 those who perished in it : notwithstanding
 which, I know the author of this history
 was firmly persuaded, that every man who
 suffered was possessed of an immortal soul ;
 and it is unfair to infer from the like omis-

H

sion

sion in the Mosaic history of the deluge, that Moses did not entertain the same opinion.

“ In the account of Joseph’s death, ‘ I am citing my author,’ it is said, Gen. l. 26, “ They embalmed him, and he was put “ into a coffin in Egypt.” It is not said “ that there was any part of him that was “ not embalmed, and that could not be put “ into a coffin.”* And if a future historian should say, George II. was embalmed, put into a coffin, and deposited in Henry VII.’s chapel, it would, I humbly conceive, be no proof, either that the breath which God had breathed into his bodily substance, was embalmed and buried with it, or that the historian thought so. Aye, continues our author, but “ upon our grave-stones we never “ see inscribed, *here lies such a person*, but “ always, *here lies the body*, or *the remains*, “ or *what was mortal* of such a person.”

What

* Disq. p. 121.

What evasion is this! Who sees not, that to give the least degree of pertinence to the remark, the passage just cited from Genesis, ought to have been Joseph's epitaph, and not the historical account of his death? The Jews as well as we, in their epitaphs, often implied or alluded to the continuation of the soul's existence: as the forms following, formerly, as well as at this day, in use, sufficiently testify, "This stone is in remembrance of Moses, who is gone up to the Lord."—"The Lord hath called Samuel," and the like.

In our own church yards, it is true, that we frequently read on the gravestones inscribed, *here lies the body of Thomas Wilson, &c.* But in the language of Thomas Wilson's historian, we should read that, "he was a man of multifarious erudition: a philosopher, a divine, a metaphysician, a rhetorician, an historian: that having

“ acquired great fame in each of those va-
 “ rious branches of science, he wrote a
 “ book to prove, that a man and his watch
 “ were equally machines, and essentially the
 “ same : and that when they were both
 “ worn out, they would return to the
 “ same original state, from whence, for
 “ different purposes in life, they were both
 “ of them formed. By the opinions in that
 “ publication propagated, men conceived
 “ the dignity of their nature degraded, re-
 “ ligion insulted, the interests of morality in-
 “ jured, and the bonds of civil society slack-
 “ ened : and therefore, instead of experi-
 “ encing the admiration of mankind, to
 “ which he presumed this glorious display
 “ of singularity would entitle him, being
 “ treated by them with indifference or
 “ contempt, he — — —.” And though
 the historian mentions not a syllable of
 there being *another part of Thomas Wil-*
son,

son, that was not buried there, yet might he be *vulgar* enough to think so. In truth, the historian gave us the concluding scene of Joseph's existence in this world; and it did not lie in his way to discourse of his transactions in the next.

On the supposition of an intermediate state, the author thinks it would have been an act of "cruelty and injustice, in the case of a good man, as of Lazarus, who had been dead four days, to recal him from a state of unmixed happiness, to the troubles and miseries of this life." And if this life, according to his observation, be a life of trouble and misery; it would also have been cruel to have called the soul of Lazarus back again, even from a state of non-existence: for it is certainly better not to be at all, than to be miserable. The denial therefore of an intermediate state does not exonerate this act of our Lord from
the

the *appearance of cruelty and injustice*, with which our author has obliquely charged it: and the remark is in this instance nugatory. But as it has been used to a worse purpose, and with a worse design, than I trust is here intended; I will give it a more particular consideration, than the introduction of it in this place requires.

This temporary state can be supposed to bear no proportion to eternity. Of course, the greatest misery that a man can in this life sustain, bearing no proportion to the happiness and misery of a future eternal state, can, in itself considered, claim no title to recompense in such state. And if extreme misery in this life, on the preceding supposition, be in exact justice too trifling, to claim any recompence; the remanding of Lazarus back to this world, on the same supposition, is an act of such cruelty, as in exact justice has no claim to recompence,

recompence, and therefore, on the presumption of a succeeding eternity, is in reality no cruelty at all. Besides, it is very doubtful how long Lazarus lived after his resurrection: and there is no good reason to believe he experienced, while he did live, any great and singular misery. But to whatever size this act of supposed cruelty may in imagination be swelled, the end, for which the miracle was performed, is sufficient to stop the mouth of obloquy: and in regard to the sufferer, could not infinite power, and would not infinite justice abundantly recompence it?

The resurrection from death of the two children by Elijah and Elishah; of Jairus's daughter, the young man at Nain, and Lazarus by our Saviour, were all præternatural acts; and the circumstances immediately preceding them, might be præternatural too. In that short separation from their respective bodies, the souls might not have

have entered the assembly of *the spirits of just men made perfect*; but have been disposed of by their Almighty Creator in some other manner: they might have retained no memory of what occurred to them in a separate state: or they might have discovered such occurrences to their cotemporary friends, though such accounts may never have reached us.

The above remarks respecting Lazarus, I have already intimated, are not entirely new: the same sentiment I find express'd, by an author of great eminence, in words nearly the same: "If Lazarus's soul had been in paradise, 'says the *excellent* Mr. Woolston,' it was hardly a good work in Jesus to recal it, for thirty years afterwards, to the miseries and troubles of this wicked world."* Here I can not help

* Woolston's 5th Disc. on the mir. of our Saviour, P. 34.

help observing the different mode of expression in these two *celebrated* writers. Mr. Woolston with great delicacy declares the act to have been *hardly a good work*: but our author scruples not to stigmatize it with cruelty and injustice. I leave the ingenious reader to determine, whether the striking similarity of the two passages be the fortuitous coincidence of great wits; or the hero of our present subject has been raking into Woolston's dunghil of scurrilities, in search of arguments to support his uncomfortable system.

The Psalmist, I agree with the author, in the passage next cited by him, very justly exclaims, Ps. cxv. 17. *In death there is no remembrance of thee. In the grave who shall give thee thanks?* I never conceived, that the perceptive faculties were buried in the grave. The point of contest between us is, whether there be not a vital principle that escapes the grave;

grave: a supposition this, which the acknowledgment of no vital principle in the grave does not disprove,

The whole psalm is a hymn of thanksgiving for some signal deliverance the Jewish nation had received: throughout which we find the help and power of Jehovah contrasted with the impotence of idols. And the concluding turn is, allowing for the abrupt transition peculiar to the eastern stile and manner of writing, "destroyed, and
 " cut off, as we had been, from the land of
 " the living, but through thy protection,
 " *we should no longer have praised thee. But,*
 " for the salvation he hath wrought, as the
 " following and concluding verse runs, *we*
 " *will bless the Lord from this time forth for*
 " *ever more. Praise the Lord,"*

But now comes a passage, that is to establish our author's doctrine beyond the reach
 of

of controversy. It is from Job; and so full and decisive in his favour, that he declares it impossible to mistake the meaning of it. Job xiv. 7. *"There is hope of a tree, if it be cut down, that it will sprout again, and that the tender branch thereof will not cease. Though the root thereof wax old in the earth, and the stock thereof die in the ground, yet through the scent of water it will bud, and bring forth boughs like a plant. But man dieth, and wasteth away, yea man giveth up the ghost, and where is he? As the waters fail from the sea, and the flood decays, and dries up, so man lieth down and riseth not till the heavens be no more. They shall not awake, nor be raised out of their sleep."*

Notwithstanding the confidence of our author, that it is possible to mistake the meaning of this passage, I shall very soon evince, either by mistaking it myself, or proving that he did not understand it. It is very easy in a stile of confidence to assert,
that

that “ nothing can be more evident [from “ the above quotation] than that Job considered man as *altogether* insensible in “ death.” And it would be equally easy to affirm the contrary. But as some readers are too fastidious to pay the implicit obedience to mere assertions, which some writers expect, I will propose the grounds of my dissent from the opinion of this author, in an explication of the passage at large, in which if I err, I shall be obliged to any one, who will set me right,

The book of Job is the picture of a great and good man, struggling with afflictions: endeavouring to acquaint himself with the meaning of them, and the motives of God’s dispensations in such visitations; expressive of great doubts, and various conjectures: which are put in the mouths of the different speakers. The chapter, from whence this quotation is extracted, contains part of Job’s pleading

pleading with God for a remission of the divine chastisements : founded on the littleness and insignificancy of man, whom therefore he considers in the most mortifying light. He compares the shortness of his duration on earth, to a flower *that is cut down*, and a shadow *that fleeth away*. He then changes the simile to that of the trunk of a tree : which pursuing to the excision of it, he gives it the preference to the human body. For, continues he, *though the root thereof wax old in the earth, and the stock thereof die in the ground, yet the vegetative principle remains, it will bud and bring forth boughs*. But when the trunk of man *dieth and wasteth away* ; it yields no new boughs, his vital principle goes not with it : where then, or how, doth it exist ? And a verse or two farther, he adds, *if a man die, shall he live ?* Not, as our translation has it, *shall he live again ?* But, shall he continue to live ? It then immediately follows, abruptly, and without

without connection, such being the idiom of the original language ; which connection may however be properly supplied by, *then, if so, or the like ; I will await all the days of my appointed time, i. e. I will patiently expect all the days of my appointed time, till my change come.* Here it must be observed, death is called a change, a transition from one state of existence to another, not a reduction of the intellectual powers to dust : which is as absolute an annihilation, as matter can undergo. And though our author, to serve his system, would refer the days of this appointed time, to the days passed in the grave ; the terms and mode of expression suit not such allusion, but have a plain reference to this life : and so they are used in this very chapter. *Seeing his days are determined, the number of his months is with thee, thou hast appointed his bounds, that he cannot pass : turn from him, that he may rest ; till he shall accomplish, as an hireling,*
his

his day. *Days and months* are terms, that would be very awkwardly applied to a man in his reduced state of dust and ashes. *Bounds also, that he cannot pass*, is an expression that argues some active power in the subject, though an insuperable barrier to its movements is declared. And lastly, the allusion of *fulfilling as an hireling his day*, implies the accomplishment of something to be performed:

I must not omit the latter part of our author's quotation, in which the simile is again changed, and with great propriety applies: *As the waters fail from the sea, and the flood decayeth and drieth up: so man lieth down, and riseth not; till the heavens be no more, they shall not awake, nor be raised out of their sleep.* Now, we know that the waters fail from the sea, and from rivers, by exhalations upwards. So also Solomon describes the failure or death of man, by the
 * spirit

spirit of man going upwards.* And the plain exposition of the passage is, 'man lieth down, and riseth not, till the consummation of all things: his spirit mounting upwards, just as waters are exhaled from seas and rivers, when they fail, or are dried up.'

The same kind of allusion, we find, Job v. 26. *Thou shalt come to thy grave in a full age, like as a shock of corn COMETH in his season*, or, as the Hebrew word properly signifies, *ascendeth in his season*. And it is remarkable, that the word *העלה* which in its primary sense signifies, *he made to ascend*, is frequently used for *he hath cut off, or, killed*. Ps. cii. 24. *I said, O my God, TAKE ME NOT AWAY, in the midst of my years; in the Hebrew, 'make me not to ascend.'*
Job,

* Eccles. iii. 21.

Job, xxxvi. 20. *Desire not the night when people ARE CUT OFF in their place; in the Hebrew, 'are made to ascend.'*

That the author of the book of Job did acknowledge the immortality of the soul, I have little doubt: several passages imply it, and some plainly assert it. Ch. iv. verse 18, and 19. *Behold he put no trust in his servants, and his angels he chargeth with folly. How much less in them, that dwell in houses of clay, whose foundation is in the dust, which are crushed before the moth.* The meaning of which passage seems to be, 'He put no trust in the excellencies and abilities of angelic spirits, these ministers of his that do his pleasure: how much less in those inferiour spirits that animate human bodies, houses of clay,* so frail and frangible, subject to so
I many

* 2 Cor. v. 1. The same mode of expression is used, where οἰκία σπυρίτου is put in contrast with οἰκία ἀχρεῖων.
σπυρίτου αἰωνίου ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς.

many casualties, that they are more liable to be crushed than the moth.' If we understand *houses of clay* in a literal sense, we lessen the appositeness of the contrast, which seems to be between spirits of different natures, and we describe the insignificancy of man, by living in a house of clay, in a manner little suitable to the pen of the sublime, bold, and figurative writer of the book of Job.

Job xix. 25. "*I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that he shall stand at the latter day upon the earth. And though, after my skin, worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God: whom I shall see for myself, and mine eyes shall behold, and not another, though my reins shall be consumed within me.*" From "this celebrated passage," says our author, "it is evident, that all the hope Job had of a future life, was founded on his belief of a resurrection, and not on a state
" of

“ of separation from the body.” Job’s belief in a resurrection I am not inclined to dispute : but the forms there made use of, such as *skin, worms, body, flesh*; I think, evidently allude to a resurrection of the body : a doctrine by no means inconsistent with the intermediate existence of the soul; that vital principle, which the light of nature, and, as I conceive, tradition taught, did not go with the body to the chambers of death ; and, therefore, might be reasonably supposed to exist in a separate state elsewhere.

From Job our author flies to Solomon; who, he asserts, “ evidently considers the “ whole of man as equally mortal with the “ brutes.” And this assertion he endeavours to support by the following passage : *God shall judge the righteous and the wicked, for there is a time there for every purpose, and for every work. I said in my heart, concern-*

ing the estate of the sons of men, that God might manifest them, and that they might see that they themselves are beasts, (or rather, as in the original, that they are beasts to themselves) For that, which befalleth the sons of man, befalleth beasts, even one thing befalleth them. As the one dieth, so dieth the other : yea they have all one breath. So that a man has no pre-eminence over a beast : for all is vanity. All go to one place. All are of the dust, and all return to dust again. This passage is supposed, by many commentators, to be part of a dialogue ; in which different opinions in respect of religion, are put into the mouths of the different speakers : and, therefore, every assertion, we there meet with, is not to be considered as the sentiment of the author. And this mode of writing appears frequent, not only in this book of Ecclesiastes, but in other parts of the writings of Solomon.

The

The author, however, says, he sees no reason for reducing it to a dialogue, as “the doctrine is perfectly agreeable to the uniform tenor of the scriptures.” * Whether the doctrine of the soul’s materiality be agreeable to the uniform tenor of the scriptures, I am again † to remind him, is the subject of dispute. But making every concession he can wish, and rejecting the supposition of a dialogue, let us examine whether this favourite doctrine of his be deducible from the passage before us, considered as a regular and uninterrupted discourse.

On the general wickedness of mankind, Solomon says, he had made his observation. Eccl. iii. 16. *I saw under the sun the place of judgment, that wickedness was there; and the place of righteousness, that iniquity was there. I said in my heart, God will judge for these*

* Disq. p. 128.

† Reflect. p. 36.

these things. For there is a time there for every purpose, and for every work. The meaning of this is too plain, to need a comment. Then, continues he, *I said in my heart concerning the estate of the sons of men, that God might manifest them, and that they might see that they are beasts to themselves ; i. e.* It appeared to me, that God tolerated their conduct, that he might discover men to themselves: and shew them, that considered only with respect to this present life, which is the only thing valued and regarded by most men, (and to display the vanity whereof, is the principal subject of that book) they are as vain and miserable creatures, as the beasts over whom they lord it: the great difference between men and beasts, being such as respects the other life. They are, like them, liable to the evils of pain and disease; are ~~both~~ alike subject to death. They all go to one place, that is, dust; from whence all were taken. But who
con-

considereth the difference between the spirit of man and of beast : the spirit that goeth upward, and the spirit that goeth downward to the earth, *who knoweth ?* i. e. there are few that know, few that will consider this difference, and live above brutal lusts and desires. This is no uncommon mode of expression : so Prov. xxxi. 10, *Who can find a virtuous woman ?* Isa. liii. 1. *Who hath believed our report ?* And that the interpretation here offered, is the true sense of the passage, may be proved in the same book, almost beyond a doubt. *Then shall the dust return to the earth, as it was ; and the spirit shall return unto God* [to the disposal of God] *who gave it.* Eccl. xii. 7. The author is aware how very expressive this passage is of the different nature of soul and body ; and therefore enters his caveat against the plain and obvious meaning of it : as being, according to his old form of declaration,

“ contrary

“contrary to the whole tenor of the scriptures.”*

But why is the literal sense of this passage contrary to the whole tenor of the scriptures? Why truly, because it “supposes the souls of departed men to be in heaven with God and Christ.” By no means: it supposes the souls of departed men to return to the immediate disposal of God. And that the souls of good men after death exist with Christ, in heaven, I trust, not by the vague assertion of “the general tenour of the scriptures;” but by direct and particular proof from thence adduced, may be satisfactorily evinced. We learn, Acts iii. 21. *That the heavens shall receive him [Christ] till the time of the restitution of all things.* Those heavens, which at the consummation of all things, we are further informed, 2 Pet. iii. 10, and 12, *shall pass away,*

* Disq. p. 129.

away, and be dissolved. And that after death good men shall be with Christ, unless that was a peculiar privilege granted to St. Paul, which there is no ground to suppose, that apostle places beyond all doubt. Philip, i. 23. *I am in a strait betwixt two; having a desire to depart, and to be with Christ, which is far better: nevertheless to abide in the flesh is more needful for you.* Now, if the Apostle were not to be with Christ till after the general resurrection, here would be no dilemma. He might, on this supposition, continue in the flesh an useful labourer in the gospel many years longer: and yet be with Christ, equally soon, as if he had died much more early. So, the same Apostle declares his willingness to be absent from the body, in confidence that he should then be present with the Lord. 2 Cor. v. 8. *We are confident and willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord.* The tenour of the
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six first verses of this chapter is to the same effect.

That Christ shall reign in the heavens till the general resurrection; and that the day of judgment shall put an end to his mediatorial kingdom and government, is plainly asserted, 1 Cor. xv. 24, &c. *Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the father; when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority, and power. For he must reign, till he hath put all his enemies under his feet. The last enemy, that shall be destroyed, is death.* Since then we find, Christ was to possess a kingdom, and reign, from the time of his humiliation on earth, to the general judgment; it may be pertinently asked, of whom is his mediatorial kingdom to consist? And till a more satisfactory answer can be given to this question, I shall continue to suppose, that the blessed inhabitants of that kingdom are,

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in the language of the Apostle to the Hebrews, *orders of angels, and the spirits of just men made perfect*; i. e. who have perfected and finished their course, having escaped all the dangers and temptations of the present world.

The last scriptural authority our author cites in support of his system, is a passage in the Revelation; “which, ‘says he,’ may be interpreted in a manner equally favourable to this doctrine. We read, Rev. xx, 4. *I saw under the altar the souls of them that were beheaded for the witness of Jesus, and for the word of God, &c.—And they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years. But the rest of the dead lived not again till the thousand years were ended.*” I am happy, in every opportunity, of professing, as I do most cordially in this place, my coincidence of opinion with that of our learned author. With him I hold this passage *equally favourable*

avourable to his doctrine, with the rest he has adduced.

How the soul can be made visible, under what emblems those souls might be represented, or by what means the information of their character was communicated to the evangelist, are points, which, in this place, need not be agitated: the passage, in its literal sense, denotes souls in a separated state. It was not the souls that were beheaded, which John saw: but *the souls of those that were beheaded*: οἱ τινες οὐ προσέκυνησαν, &c. not αἱ τινες. *And they lived and reigned*; i. e. they would live, they were destined to live and reign. Οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ τῶν νεκρῶν, *but the rest of the dead lived not again, till the thousand years were ended.* Οἱ λοιποὶ τῶν νεκρῶν not αἱ λοιπαὶ ψυχαί: here is nothing which contradicts the opinion, that the rest of the souls might also then exist in a separated state, and in another place; a
place

place of darkness, or as the author of the book of Job describes it : * *Where the light is as darkness.* †

Now let us examine our author's critical powers, and see with what adroitness he twines this passage to his purpose. "It is plain, ' says he' that he [John] saw them not as unembodied souls, but as living men, after a real resurrection; and therefore he did not see the rest of the dead souls at all; for being dead, they had no souls or lives." There is something too hasty in this conclusion: for those souls might exist, though John did not see them. To make it more complete,

* Job x. 22.

† This description by no means suits with the idea of a grave: it denotes a place, in which the soul in a separated state exists, and possesses sensations: a place, in which it shall perceive light, though in comparison of that glory, which shall, after the general judgment, be revealed, that light shall be comparatively as darkness.

pleat, his argument should have run thus : he did not see them, because they did not exist ; and they did not exist, because he did not see them.

SECTION II.

Additional Observations on the Doctrine of an intermediate State: adduced from the Authority of the Scriptures.

THE doctrine of an intermediate state is such, as no good man can wish to be false : nor could my author, as a friend to society, wish to inculcate in the minds of others, an opinion, that it is so ; had he properly reflected on the pernicious consequences, with which the general prevalence of such an opinion must be attended. When men, who firmly believe in another life, and a future judgment, for the short-lived gratification

tion of some irregular passion, sacrifice their claim to eternal felicity : what is the reason of so perverse an election ? Is it not, that the pleasures of this life are at hand, and those of the next distant ? And will not this argument, in favour of present pleasures, be the stronger, the farther the distance is to which you remove those in expectancy ? If so : a belief, that an indefinite number, perhaps many millions of years, will intervene between our present and post-existence, must tend to quicken our pursuits of present pleasures, and create in us a less attention to a post-existent state, than a nearer expectation of it would effect : and such a belief must, of course, have a bad effect on the morals of mankind. But, as no *truth*, by being known, can have a bad influence on men's lives and manners ; nor any idea be more derogatory to the infinite purity and perfection of the divine nature, than that which supposes him necessitated to establish morality

morality upon the belief of an untruth; whatever doctrine has a tendency to lessen the force of moral motives, carries with it a strong suspicion, if not evident conviction, of its falsity.

It may be urged, that a state of insensibility, in respect to the person immersed in it, measures no period of time; that the article of death, and the summons to a resurrection, though millions of years should roll between them, are points that apparently touch each other: but this is a kind of reasoning, too abstruse for the gross of mankind, who can compute time only by hours, months, and years; and in whose minds distance of time, so marked out, diminishes the object, just as in vision the distance of space does the object of the eye.

In the preceding section I applied myself wholly to obviate the objections, our author

I have had advanced against the doctrine of
 an intermediate state, on the supposed au-
 thority of the scriptures. The reader will
 determine the force of those passages, which
 he has, on this occasion, called to his as-
 sistance. And as he has shown himself dis-
 posed to put the proof of his doctrine on the
 test of the scriptures, I am on that ground
 ready to join issue with him. Indeed that is
 the proper, the only firm foundation, where-
 on to place the point of contest. Men, expert
 in metaphysical subtleties, may, like dextrous
 duellists, contend, pass, and parry, with-
 out other aim, than that of displaying their
 own adroitness. And disputes of this kind
 may amuse literary minds, but will never sa-
 tisfy a sober enquirer after truth. What we
 know of the nature of the mind, we must
 be content to learn from the scriptures.

Such are the sentiments of a man, whose
 enlarged capacity of mind, and indefatiga-

ble industry in pursuit of truth, were equal to any thing that human reason can comprehend : who, at the same time that he does not discourage 'philosophical enquiries, declares it his opinion, that the objects of them " must be bound over at last unto religion, there to be determined and defined : for otherwise they will lie open to many errors and illusions of sense. For seeing that the substance of the soul was not deduced and extracted at her creation from the masses of heaven and earth, but immediately inspired from God ; and seeing the laws of heaven and earth are the proper subjects of philosophy, how can the knowledge of the substance of reasonable souls be derived or fetched from philosophy ? But it must be drawn from the same inspiration, from whence the substance thereof first flowed." *

To

* Bacon's Advancement of Learning, b. iv. ch. 3,

To those passages of scripture, adduced by our author, to which due attention hath been already paid, I now propose in turn to offer some additional ones; of which he has prudently taken no notice.

Thou wilt not leave, says the Psalmist, xvi. 10. *my soul in hell; nor suffer thy holy one to see corruption.* This prophecy plainly contains a double allusion; to the soul, and body: it is applied by St. Peter * to Christ; and in him was completely verified. His *soul* was not left in hell, [or hades] the place of separated souls, which the word *adns* properly signifies; nor was his *body* permitted to see corruption. The former part of this prophecy as evidently alludes to the soul, as the latter part does to the body. Experience convinces us, that the body does not descend *eis adnu*, but to its homogeneous dust, *where the worm is spread over it,*

K 2

and

* Acts ii. 27.

and the worm covers it. And no idea of corruptibility comports with the nature of the soul, when separately spoken of, as in the passage before us.

Elijah's prayer on the death of the widow's child, discovers his opinion of the nature of the soul, as a separate principle from the body, beyond contradiction. *O Lord, my God, says he, I pray thee let this child's soul come into him again: or, according to the original, come into his inward parts again.* He supposes the soul to be a principle independent of, and distinct from the body: he concludes it, as such, to have left the body; and prays to God, *not* to recompose the disarranged particles of the dead child, but *to remand the soul back again.*

The passages above cited, I conceive sufficient in proof, that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, though not directly asserted

asserted in the old Testament, is clearly implied. And that it was generally adopted by the Jews, as an unwritten tradition, well supported by implications from the written word, a single passage of scripture will satisfactorily evince: wherein St. Paul observes, that *the Sadducees say, there is no resurrection, neither angel or spirit*, Acts xxiii. 8.

The Jews acknowledged several orders of angels, and attributed to them different offices and appointments. Some, in particular, they supposed to be the immediate ministers of God's will: and others tutelary or guardian angels, charged with the protection of particular persons. To these latter alludes the passage in Acts, xii. 15. when the disciples, on Peter's voice being heard at the door, said, *it is his angel*. To these also our Saviour has allusion, when he enjoins us *not to despise little ones*; because *their angels*

angels continually behold the face of God. And to these most probably St. Paul alludes in the passage before us : in which this traditional doctrine of tutelary angels, and separated souls, is considered as one article : *the Pharisees*, adds the apostle, *believed* (not all three, but) *both*.

If the Sadducees believed, as some suppose, *only* the Pentateuch ; they could not consistently reject the general doctrine of angels : because, throughout these books frequent mention is made of them. But Josephus, whom we may suppose to have been well acquainted with the principles of that sect, informs us, “ that they received “ what was *written*.” The guardianship, therefore, of particular angels, experienced by good men, though an opinion both of Jews and Pagans, being no where in the Old Testament expressly taught, but only inferred, was for that reason rejected by them. Hence
in

in respect to the doctrines here mentioned, we learn the general opinion of the Jews from the particular tenets of the Sadducean sectaries. For the Sadducees, who we know, were a very inconsiderable sect, being distinguished by certain tenets, viz. the denial of the resurrection of the body, and of the existence of tutelary angels, and separated souls: it is clear, that those doctrines, the rejection of which constituted the Sadducean sect, must have been the general doctrines of the people.

These quotations from the Old Testament, I will close with two or three from Esdras, too plain to be misunderstood, and too direct to be perverted. And should the author except to the authority of a book, that has been controverted, it will, however, be so far of weight in the present case, as it conveys to us the opinion of the Jews
concern-

concerning the immortality of the soul, and an intermediate state.

Consonant with what has been already observed of the Mosaic history of the creation of man, the author of the book of Esdras thus expresses himself; enlarging, and commenting as it were, on the words of Moses.* *Thou, O Lord, gavest a body unto Adam without a soul, which was the workmanship of thine hands, and didst breathe into him the breath of life; and he was made living before thee.* 2 Esd. iii. 5. Here the prophet speaks of the body, as a substance distinct and different from the soul: he seems in this declaration, “that the body was “created *without* a soul,” positively to assert the immateriality of the soul: and describes the creation of it, as not effected by any particular organization of matter. He represents the two parts of man, as principles

* Gen. ii. 7.

ples independent of each other: and mentions two operations, and two different operations too, in the creation of them.

As the passage above cited, inculcates the immateriality of the soul: the next I shall offer from the same book, is as strongly declarative of an intermediate state. When Esdras represents what passed in the *chambers of the dead*, the *active* * dead, before the day of judgment: the expression can only signify the intermediate state. And it is very plain, that the existence of such a state, was not only his own opinion, but the general opinion of those to whom he addressed himself.

* Though the intermediate state be sometimes represented as a state of *rest*; that rest does not signify a state of insensibility; but a state of rest from the cares and troubles of this mortal life: and such is Ambrose's representation of it. "Incipiunt intelligere *requiem* suam, et futuram suam gloriam prævidere. Eâque se consolatione mulcentes, in habitaculis suis cum magnâ tranquillitate requiescunt, stipatæ præfidiis angelorum."

Ambr. de Bono Mortis, c. 10.

himself. Else, before he talked to them of the transactions in a state, the existence of which they did not believe; he would have endeavoured to convince them that such a state existed.

2 Esd. iv. 35. *Did not the souls also of the righteous ask questions of these things in their chambers, saying, how long shall I hope on this fashion? When cometh the fruit of the floor of our reward? And unto these things Uriel the Archangel gave them answer, and said, even when the number of seeds is filled in you: for he hath weighed the world in the balance. By measure hath he measured the times, and by number hath he numbered the times: and he doth not move, nor stir them, untill the said measure be fulfilled. Then answered I, and said, O Lord, that bearest rule, even we all are full of impiety: and for our sakes peradventure it is, that the floors of the righteous are not filled, because of the sins of them that dwell*

dwell on the earth. So he answered me, and said, go thy way to a woman with child, and ask of her, when she hath fulfilled her nine months, if her womb may keep the birth any longer within her. Then said I; no, Lord, that can she not. And he said unto me, in the grave, the chambers of souls are like the womb of a woman: for like as a woman, that travaileth, maketh haste to escape the necessity of the travail; even so do these places haste to deliver those things that are committed to them. This passage is part of a dialogue between the angel Uriel and Eſdras: in which the angel informs him, that the righteous cannot receive their reward, till the consummation of all things: till that which is sown be turned upside down, and the place where the evil is sown pass away. Then, continues the prophet, I answered and said, how and when shall these things come to pass? To which the angel replied, Do not thou hasten above the most highest. Affect not knowledge, nor enquire into things that
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are above thee. *Did not the souls also of the righteous ask questions of these things in their chambers?* &c. To which I only answered, when their numbers were filled up, and the predetermined times of God were accomplished.—*In the grave [in death] the chambers of souls are like the womb of a woman: both have the determined time of producing their birth.**

There is one more passage in this book of Esdras, so fully descriptive of the resurrection of the body, and the dismissal of souls from *their chambers*, at the general judgment,

* In allusion to the same metaphor of a woman in travail, the transition from the chambers of souls to their reunion with the body, seems to be by our Saviour himself, styled *παλιγγενεσις* a second birth: for the bringing of us to life again at the resurrection, the context shews to be in this place the sense of the word, rather than either the regeneration of baptism, or of the spirit. *Matth. xix. 28. Verily, verily, I say unto you, that ye who have followed me, in the regeneration when the son of man shall sit on the throne of his glory, ye also shall sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel.*

ment, that I can not pass it by. 2 Esd. vii. 32. *And the earth shall restore those that are asleep in her, and so shall the dust those that dwell in silence; and the secret places shall deliver those souls that were committed unto them.* That is, the earth shall give up those that are entombed in her, and the dust those that are reduced, dispersed, and however incorporated with her, and the *souls* shall from the secret places of separate existence be discharged.

If we descend into the New Testament, we shall there find the same doctrine, more frequently and strongly implied. When our Saviour cautions men against offending God, at the same time exhorting them to bear up against the ill treatment of men: he grounds his caution and exhortation on this principle, that the body is all man's outrage can affect; the soul, which is immortal, being out of their reach, and liable to destruction only by the will and power of God.

God: Matth. x. 28. *Fear not them who kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him, who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell.* Were there not another passage in the scriptures, that implied the immortality of the soul; I should esteem this sufficiently express to authorise the doctrine, against the tortured passages adduced in contradiction to it. It is pleasant to see how dextrously our author affects to evade the force of it.

“ When we consider, ‘ says he, ’ that ac-
 “ cording to the uniform tenour of the scrip-
 “ tures, and especially our Saviour’s own
 “ discourses and parables, there is no pu-
 “ nishment in hell, till after the resurrecti-
 “ on, it will be evident that his meaning
 “ could only be, that men have power
 “ over us only in this life, but God in the
 “ life to come; meaning by the soul, the
 “ life, and in this place, the future and
 “ better life of man in opposition to the
 “ pre-

“ present.”* Very well; granting what he contends for, granting our Saviour’s meaning to be, that men have power over us only in this life, but God in the life to come: what does this prove? Does it prove, that they, who kill the body, can as easily kill the soul; which must be the case, if the soul be homogeneous with the body, a piece of organized clay?

But the author requires still more to be granted: by *soul*, he supposes to be meant *life*. He could scarcely demand such a concession, if he did but consider what language he in consequence of it put into the mouth of our Lord. *Fear not them who kill the body, but are not able to kill the life: but rather fear him, who is able to destroy both life and body in hell.* Indeed, so far from granting that by the word *soul*, life is meant; had the word *life* been written, I must have supposed soul to have been meant;

* Disquisitions, &c. p. 110.

meant; because I should have supposed the evangelist to have written intelligibly. But, to drop this verbal dispute, I would beg the author to consider, that they, who kill the body, on the principle of materialism, must at the same time kill the soul: and if they could not be said to kill the soul, because God would raise it up; for the same reason, they could not be said to kill the body. And if they, who kill the body, can not kill the soul, as our Saviour has assured us, it is because the soul naturally and necessarily subsists after death.

In the New Testament, we find such a place as paradise thrice mentioned. First by St. Luke, where our Saviour tells the penitent thief, *to day shalt thou be with me in paradise.* It is also mentioned by St. Paul, 2 Cor. xii. 4. And in Revel. ii. 7. by St. John. It is very clear by the manner in which both the apostle and evangelist mention it, that they at least believed the present

sent real existence of such a place: and our Saviour's words declare it beyond a doubt.

Without entering into scholastic discussions concerning the nature of the place: it is sufficient to my purpose, to be assured on the word of our Lord, that there is such a place; and that the malefactor after death, *immediately* after death, met our Lord there. I shall content myself with proving where it could not be; leaving to my learned author, the task of ascertaining where paradise is.

It could not be in the grave; because we know they did not meet there: it could not be in the supreme heaven; because Christ did not till many days after ascend thither: it could not be in hell [meaning the place of the wicked]; because such a promise, in such circumstances, would be a kind of mockery at misery and woe; which the minute of penitence could not merit, and the benevolent

lent author of our salvation could not on a repentant suppliant retort.

And that the *body* of the malefactor did that day meet our Lord in paradise, we have no authority to believe. Had his body been raised, the miracle had been as great as the resurrection of our Saviour himself; and it would certainly not have been passed by unnoticed. It must therefore, have been some other part of him, than that which after death was committed to the grave. And from hence, wherever that place may be, and whatever part of the malefactor might immediately after death pass thither, (which however, till I am better informed, I shall suppose, in the first instance, to be the residence of departed souls from death to the resurrection; and, in the second, that the *soul* of the malefactor was translated to it) I shall analogically conclude, that some immaterial, invisible part of every good man, which neither the fury of men, nor the ravage of bodily disease can kill, will immediately
after

after death be waſted thither. To elude the force of this paſſage, ſome have been driven to the wretched reſource of altering the punctuation; thereby making the word *σημερον* redundant, and throwing the ſentence into a form which no authority will juſtify.

If, to eſtabliſh the doctrine of the immortality of the ſoul on ſcripture proof, more paſſages than thoſe already cited can be thought neceſſary; I would produce our Lord's answer to the Sadducees. Beſides, the denial of a reſurrection of the body, we learn, Acts xxiii. 8. that they denied the exiſtence of immaterial beings, ſuch as angels and ſpirits. And our Saviour ſo directs his answer to the queſtion propoſed to him, as to enforce the doctrine of a reſurrection, on proof of the truth of another doctrine, which they diſbelieved, the immortality of the ſoul: for the paſſage plainly bears reſpect

to both: And this unexpected retort it was, that, we are told, *put the Sadducees to silence.*

In ridicule of the resurrection, they propose to our Saviour a weak and frivolous question: to which he gives a pertinent answer; and addresses himself to them in further support of the doctrine, which, like our modern Sadducees, when they could not reason, they had affected to laugh, out of doors; establishing the credibility of it, upon the assurance of the immortality of the soul, according to the express letter of their own scriptures: *περί δε τῆς ἀναστάσεως*
And as to a resurrection, adds he, *have ye not read, what God said to you? I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. Learn hence therefore that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, do even now exist, waiting for a reunion with their bodies: for God is not a God of the dead, but of the living.**

The

* Matt. xxi. 23.

The denial of the immortality of the soul is distinguished by Josephus, * as a principal tenet of the Sadducean sect; and therefore, we may conclude, could not be the general doctrine of the Jews. And direct against that tenet, was the latter part of our Lord's reply. If both the soul and body of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob had been by his hearers supposed extinct at the time our Saviour addressed that argument to the Sadducees; it must have appeared a very imperfect one, nor can we easily suppose he could have received the acknowledgment that was paid him, of having *silenced them*. For his argument required, that they should exist at the time when he was speaking: else God could not be asserted, as God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, to be the God *not of the dead, but of the living*. The expression, as our Saviour used it, plainly implied

* *ἡ δὲ τοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἀναισθησία* Joseph. in Antiq.
xviii. 1.

implied a present relation between God and them; whereas there can be no relation between God and those that do not exist.

The last extract I shall make from the scriptures of the New Testament, is a passage from St. Paul's affectionate epistle to the Philippians. *I am in a strait*, says he, *between two; having a desire to depart, and to be with Christ, for it is much better: but to remain in the flesh is more necessary for you.* Phil. i. 23 and 24. The word ἀναλυσιν, signifies in this place to depart, or migrate from the world: and Dr. Hammond with great probability supposes the phrase to have been adopted from a sea term; λυειν signifying to loose from the haven, *oram solvere*, and absolutely *solvere*, to loose.* The same apostle in his second epistle to the Corinthians, expresses the same sentiment in words somewhat different. *We are confident and*
willing

* Vide Hamm. in Loc.

willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord. 2 Cor. v. 8.

The words translated, *to be absent from the body*, are ἐκδημῆσαι ἐκ τοῦ σώματος to travel from this bodily dwelling; καὶ ἐνδημῆσαι πρὸς τὸν Κύριον, and to dwell with the Lord.

Now, if it had been the apostle's opinion, that after death he should be reduced to a state of absolute insensibility: would he have been in a strait which to chuse, whether to become a real clod of earth, or to remain an active labourer in the vineyard of Christ: strengthening the weak in the truth, and winning over the dissolute to obedience, to the precepts, of the gospel? Would that apostle have made a doubt, which of those stations it were best for him to occupy; whose benevolence rose so high, that he in another epistle declared, he could bear to be excommunicated and excluded the christian

tian assemblies himself (thereby implying, that he would gladly submit himself to the greatest temporal calamities that could befall him, which in his estimation was *anathema* *eternum* to be excommunicated from the assemblies of christians) could he by that means save, and bring into the christian covenant, his brethren, kinsmen, and friends? * Could St. Paul hesitate whether to prefer a temporary annihilation, at the thought of which nature shudders, to time spent in acts of boundless benevolence; in emancipating the captivated from the cares and follies of this world, by opening to them the prospect of life and immortality in the next: especially when the merit of such labours, and the reward annexed to them must have been well known to him? *He that turneth a sinner from the error of his way, shall save a soul from death, and cover a multitude of sins.* Jam. v. 20.

The

* Rom. ix. 3.

The fact is, that St. Paul entertained a very different opinion, if we may pay any credit to his own words. His dilemma was a struggle between self-satisfaction, and a regard to the welfare of his brethren: it proceeds entirely on the supposition, that as soon as *ἐκδημέσεν ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς* he had quitted his bodily dwelling, *ἐνδημέσεν πρὸς τοῦ χριστοῦ*, he had a dwelling with Christ. And had he intended in this place directly to have inculcated the doctrine of the soul's immortality; I scarcely know how he would have fixed on words, that could have made it clearer.

In proof that the doctrine of the soul's immortality, and of course of an intermediate state, is the doctrine of the scriptures, the preceding extracts from thence, will, I trust, be esteemed sufficient: a much longer catalogue of passages, some apparently inclining to it, and some more clearly implying

ing it, I have declined to produce; presuming those already cited to be decisive in point. It is the force and perspicuity of a few passages, on which I lay my stress; and not on the parade of a vast number of doubtful ones: well knowing that a dextrous pen will easily twine and torture such, so as to make them speak, and plausibly too, whatever sentiments the writer pleases.

SECTION III.

Of the opinions of the heathen writers, and the Fathers of the four first centuries, concerning the immortality of the soul.

IT has been observed, by my author, that neither Christ, nor his apostles ever expressly declared the immortality of the soul. Nor did they ever expressly declare the existence of a God. And the reason is, that to both

both the one and the other of these doctrines mankind had ever paid an universal assent.

“ Had the sacred writers, ‘ says my author,’ really believed the existence of the
“ soul, as a principle in the human constitution, naturally distinct from, and independent of the body, it cannot but be
“ supposed, that they would have made
“ some use of it in their arguments for a
“ future life. But it is remarkable, that
“ we find *no such argument* in all the New
“ Testament.”*

The argument in proof of a future state, by our author here required, is an argument founded on the immateriality of the soul. Now the immateriality of the soul supposes its immortality; and its immortality necessarily implies a future life. The argument therefore required, is plainly an argument, in proof of a future life, grounded on an
assertion

* Disquisition, p. 130.

assertion of it. And because no such curious argument occurs in all the New Testament, therefore, my author infers, the sacred writers disbelieved it.

As our author has written for the information of the curious and inquisitive, I beg leave to ask what were those *arguments used* by the sacred writers *for a future life*, to which he alludes? They were little versed in metaphysical subtleties; and dealt more in assertions than arguments. They made other appeals in proof of the divine truths they taught, than to abstruse investigations, and the deductions of unassisted reason; and used other means of conviction, than *the enticing words of man's wisdom*. Indeed St. Paul, to convince the philosophising Greeks of the possibility of a resurrection of the body, uses an *allusion* to a grain of corn, which must be reduced to a state of corruption before it can rise again. But I desire
again

again to be referred to some of those arguments for a future life, used by the sacred writers; of which, from our author's mode of expression, his readers might justly suppose, throughout the New Testament were dispersed many.

With my author I agree, that throughout the New Testament, we find no express declaration of the immortality of the soul; for the design of Christ's mission was not to repeat truths, at that time universally known and assented to; but to *bring to light the hidden things of darkness—to bring to light life and immortality*; * not the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, for that was at the time of Christ's appearance a doctrine of universal belief, but of the resurrection of the body. The savage Scythian, the luxurious Indian, the squallid Hottentot, the illiterate Moor, however distant in country, and
different

* The word translated, immortality, is ἀφθαρσία incorruption, which properly refers only to the body.

different in customs and manners, policy and religion, all agree in this; that the soul is immortal, and will after death in some other state and place survive. And the accounts of modern travellers assert the same of those people in the South Seas, whom recent discoveries have made known to us; who, cut off from all commerce with every other part of the globe, however, they may differ from civilized nations in some things, are as uniform with them in the opinion of the soul's immortality, as they are in shape and make.*

Now,

* The people of Otaheite, that indefatigable enquirer after knowledge, Mr. Banks, informed me, believed the immortality of the soul; though they had no idea of a retribution of rewards and punishments. Their opinion is, that their nobles will in the next world be nobles,, and their slaves be slaves: * which shews, that their notion of the immortality,

* ——— Quæ gratia currum

Armorumque fuit vivis, quæ cura nitentes

Pascere equos; eadem sequitur tellure repositos.

Virg. Æn. VI.

Now, a harmony of opinion in this article so universal, must have some adequate reason. And this reason seems to be either that the doctrine, like that of the existence of a deity, must have been innate in the mind, impressed on it by its great author; or derived from primæval tradition. For it is absurd to suppose, that in rude and uncivilized states, men were so refined and perspicacious as to penetrate into a world that had no existence; and, by strange delusions fetched from thence, to procure respect; and enforce obedience, to the laws enacted for the conduct of their respective communities in this. But it surpasses all the strength of credulity to believe, that the legislators of every nation under heaven, severally

immortality of the soul is not the child of political cunning, the coinage of a statesman's brain. For the belief of a future state of existence, without a retribution of rewards and punishments, would add no vigour to the laws, nor in any degree co-operate with the civil power: it would be no incentive to virtue, no deterrent from vice.

verally hit upon this expedient; or that it was the result of their common deliberation, when assembled at some general congress.

Upon supposition that the doctrine of the soul's Immortality is traditional, which I am inclined to believe; we should not be surprised if Herodotus had ascribed the original propagation of it to the Egyptians; who, it is very probable, received it from the Hebrews, as well as many other articles of traditional knowledge, vestiges of which we find both in Plato and Herodotus: and which, though by them gleaned up in Egypt, were primarily derived from the Jewish fountain. All recondite knowledge the Greeks derived from the Egyptians: and therefore the historian, in asserting "that the Egyptians were the first, who maintained that the soul of man is immortal," * asserted nothing from whence any inference could be drawn, affecting the

* Disq. p. 168.

the truth of that doctrine, though our author introduces it in such a manner, as might induce his reader to suppose it a novel doctrine, invented by the Egyptians, and peculiar to them. Our knowledge however, and view of things, are much enlarged since the time of Herodotus : and from historians of the most respectable authority, and travellers of the best account, we are well assured, that there never did exist a nation, among whose general dogmata did not rank the immortality of the soul. General, I say ; for affectation of singularity will ever induce some individuals to think differently from the rest of their community : and a vicious life, and profligacy of manners, will make others wish such a doctrine false ; and of what we wish we are apt to impose upon ourselves a too easy belief.

Of those individuals, which our author hath called to his assistance, we will now ex-

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amine the opinions; and see how far they contribute to his purpose.

The celebrated philosopher of the Chinese, Confucius, he observes, “believed no future state of rewards and punishments.”* Not to controvert this assertion, it does not therefore follow, that he did not believe the immortality of the soul. On the contrary, the denial of a future retribution of rewards and punishments, wherever that is made an article of doctrine, implies a belief of the immortality of the soul. For to suppose the period of the soul’s existence to be terminated by death, precludes every doubt and every thought about such a doctrine as a future state of rewards and punishments. The denial, as well as the avowal, of this latter doctrine, must be built on the acknowledgment of the former. So that granting Confucius to have believed no state of future rewards
and

* Disq. p. 194.

and punishments, and to have admitted the doctrine of the soul's immortality; here is another proof of this doctrine not being a political device for the reasons already offered.

That our author might leave no part of the world unexplored, from China he transports his reader to Arabia, in search of characters, whose principles might support his hypothesis: and from thence brings Averroes to his acquaintance. This Averroes was a very celebrated physician and philosopher: he taught, if we may believe our author, § the mortality of the soul, and his disciples propagated the same doctrine. Unfortunately however for our author's purpose, nothing is more evident, than that Averroes, believed the soul to be a principle distinct from, and independent of the body, immaterial, and immortal. He supposed it to be

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§ Disquis. p. 229.

an excerpction from that great and universal soul which pervaded, invigorated, and supported all things; and after death became united to it again. Indeed this opinion of Averroes seems to be the revived doctrine of Pythagoras's *anima mundi*. And that this was the opinion of Averroes, our author does not deny. † Wonderful therefore it must appear, that he should impute to this philosopher the denial of the soul's immortality; as in effect he does by charging it upon his disciples.

It must not however be concealed, that there is a saying of his recorded by Vander Linden; and by him reported to have been frequently in his mouth: "*moriatur anima mea morte philosophorum.*" || Yet I can scarcely conceive, that a philosophic rant should lead our author to ascribe to him a doctrine,

† Disq. p. 229.

|| Van. Linden, *de scriptis medicorum*. Vossius.

doctrine, so very inconsistent with the known opinion of Averroes concerning the nature of the soul, as that of its mortality. He used to call the christian religion, an impossible religion ; the jewish a childish religion ; and the mahometan, a swineish one : and then boasting himself of a more philosophical way of thinking, exclaimed, “ *anima mea, &c. may my soul die the death of a philosopher !*” *meriatur*, not *pereat*. The philosophic death he meant, we know : viz. the reunion of his soul, after the dissolution of the body, with that first universal principle from whence it was taken.

We will now follow our author, who we find has been miserably supported by the philosophers of China and Arabia, into Greece : and see what assistance he can gain from thence. Cicero tells us, there is nothing so absurd, but what some philosopher or other hath advanced : therefore in that
land

land of philosophers, one would incline to think he might find a man to his mind. "Aristotle," says he, "it is probable was sometimes inclined to the opinion of man having no soul distinct from the body; as when he says, according to Plutarch, that sleep is common to the soul as well as to the body." * For my own part, I have already declared, that I see little difference between a sleeping and a non-existent soul: but I apprehend, there is a powerful party, who will not readily admit the inference, "that because the soul may sometimes sleep, therefore it must be material." Be this as it may: it is plain that Aristotle, even in the passage above cited, considered the soul and body as two distinct principles, when he ascribes sleep as a common property to *both*. But when he says, † "there is a fifth kind of
" sub-

* Disq. p. 198.

† Of this fifth nature Cicero supposes not only the stars and souls, but even the gods to partake.

Sin autem est quinta quaedam natura ab Aristotele induta primum; hæc & deorum est, & animorum.

Cic. Tusc. Disp. L. 1.

“ substance, distinct from the four elements,
 “ and of a different nature; of which the
 “ stars, and souls are framed:” † and
 again, distinguishes the mind by a new name,
 calling it *ενδελεχεια*, that is, a certain con-
 tinued and perpetual motion: § he leaves no
 pretence to doubt his opinion of the immor-
 ality of the soul.

Indeed I find, among all the eccentric
 geniuses of Greece, that the author has been
 able to fix only on one; whom, with all his
 dexterity, he can press into his service. “ Di-
 “ cæarchus, ‘ says Cicero,’ wrote three
 “ books, to prove that the minds of men
 “ are mortal;” and in another place he
 says, that he maintained, that there was no
 soul.” As our author has not thought fit to
 give

† Quintum genus, e quo essent astra mentesq. singulares,
 eorumq. quatuor diffimile Cic. Acad. L. 1.

§ Ipsum animun *ενδελεχεια* appellat novo nomine, qua-
 si quamdam continuatam motionem et perennem.

Cic. Tusc. Disp. L. 1.

† Disq. p. 195.

give us that philosopher's notable reason for his doctrine, I will take the liberty to supply that omission. "Ad quod credendum inductus est, 'says this same Cicero of "Dicæarchus's doctrine,' quia difficilis erat animi, quid et qualis sit, intelligentia:" he maintained there was no soul, because he could not conceive the nature of it." This is a reason, that might satisfy the philosopher, who maintained the materiality of the soul; *because he could not conceive how it could else possibly act upon the body*; and for the same reason materialised the Deity: but I am inclined to believe, it would be satisfactory to few besides.

Will then neither China nor Arabia afford assistance to a distressed author? Is no auxiliary to be found in Greece: none, but one poor doctor of the peripatetic school? Of the arguments, which that philosopher urged in proof of his doctrine, the envious
tooth

tooth of time hath robbed us. But, if those, by which he supported his opinion, were of a piece with the reason, which induced him to adopt it; the world has no just cause to lament the loss.

Cicero has, by some, been represented as wavering in opinion on this point; sometimes speaking of the soul as immortal, and sometimes as perishable with the body: and one or two doubtful quotations have been adduced in favour of the latter opinion. Our author produces none: but asserts, that, 'had any such opinion as that of an
" immaterial principle, in the modern sense
" of the word, been known in the time of
" Cicero, who has collected and discussed
" all the opinions of the Greek philoso-
" phers on that, as well as on almost every
" other question of importance, it would
" certainly have been found in his writ-
" ings." * But this is shifting the ques-
tion!

* Disq. p. 200.

tion: which is not, whether any such opinion, as that of an *immaterial substance*, in *the modern sense of the word*, be acknowledged by him; but whether he considered the soul as a principle distinct, and different from the body, not material nor perishable, but in its own nature immortal. And in proof that this was his opinion, as well as the general, I might have said, universal opinion of the philosophers, whose tenets he has collected, that of Dicæarchus excepted, I appeal to my author's own quotations. But in truth, not only the immortality of the soul is expressed in various passages of the treatise *De Senectute*, so clearly, as places Cicero's belief of it beyond a doubt: but the immateriality is also asserted, though the opinion be attributed to Xenophon; who he says, supposed "the mind to be immortal, "not an object of sight, nor otherwise discernable than from its operations." * This, perhaps,

* Animum esse immortalem, et eum non apparere; sed ex iis rebus, quas gerit, intelligi. Cic. de Senect.

perhaps, may not be immateriality *in the modern sense of the word*; but I am sure, it is in the common sense of it: and speaks to the easy comprehension of all mankind.

From the view we have taken of the opinions adopted by those very writers our author has cited, in respect to the nature of the soul, the reader will observe, how very unfavourable they are to the doctrine he has advanced: he will observe him shifting his ground, and endeavouring to lead him off from the question; entertaining him with disquisitions on the origin, instead of the nature of the soul. For the object of enquiry is not, whether the soul was produced from fire, or derived from heaven; whether it was formed at the same time with the body, or existed before it: but whether the soul be of a nature different from, and independent of the body; and consequently capable of existing after the dissolution of it.

it. And those heathen writers, to whom our author has appealed, whatever may have been their notions of the origin of the soul, or its future destination, are, a single one excepted, and him of no great fame, concurrent in their opinion of its immortality.

If also we may judge of the general opinion of the Jews, from their most eminent historians, Philo and Josephus; it is in this point, perfectly conformable to that of the Egyptians and Greeks. And though our author intimates, that Josephus "adopted this system, to accommodate his history to the taste of his readers;"* till he has advanced something in support of such a surmise, till he can cite some passages in that author, inconsistent with such an opinion, or hath discovered some general traits in his character, repugnant to the system he professedly

* Disq. p. 20

feffedly adopted ; it would be injustice to the reputation of the historian, to give such an insinuation credit. But indeed, we cannot be much surpris'd, that such an aspersions on the character of Josephus, should fall from the pen of a Christian writer ; who thought it no aspersions, to assert of him, whom he stiles OUR SAVIOUR, and who stiles himself THE TRUTH, that he might believe one doctrine, though " in compliance with the prevailing " opinion of the times," * he publicly professed another, and different one.

To the Christian fathers our author makes his last appeal: and they, if the Heathen and Jewish writers have served him little, will on examination be found to serve him less. " We find nothing, ' says he, ' said by any " Christian writer, concerning the soul, " before Justin Martyr."† Supposing this to have been the case, the doctrine of the immortality of the soul being the general doctrine

* Disq. p. 130.

† Disq. p. 204.

doctrine of every age and nation, the silence of the Christian writers on that point must be admitted as a tacit assent to it. But, indeed, they are not quite so silent on the subject, as my author conceives them to have been. There are marks, strongly characteristic of such a doctrine, to be found both in St. Clement and Polycarp, the one a disciple of St. John, and the other of St. Paul: and Justin Martyr himself flourished before the middle of the second century. The words of St. Clement are very expressive. “They, who have finished their course in love, by the favour of Christ, inhabit the region of the godly, and shall be manifested in the visitation of the kingdom of Christ.” * Here is a plain description

* ΟΙ ΕΝ ΑΓΑΠΗ ΤΕΛΕΙΟΘΕΝΤΕΣ, ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΤΩ ΧΡΙΣΤΩ ΧΑΡΙΝ
ΕΧΟΥΣΙΝ ΧΩΡΑΝ ΕΥΣΤΕΩΝ. ΟΙ ΦΑΝΕΡΩΘΗΣΟΥΝΤΑΙ ΕΝ ΤΗ ΕΠΙΣΚΟΠΗ
ΤΗΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΑΣ ΤΩ ΧΡΙΣΤΩ.

Clem. Rom. i Ep. ad Cor.

description of two states, one to which they should attain as soon as they had finished their mortal course; and where they should continue till the coming of Christ. And least this should be understood not to comprehend, the souls of all men, referring only to those of the righteous; and therefore not expressly to assert the general immortality of the soul; I will add a passage from Ignatius, who flourished about the latter end of the first or the very beginning of the second century, and was of course nearly contemporary with Clement.

“ Since then, ‘ says he,’ things have an
 “ end, and two things are placed before us,
 “ death and life; and *every one* will go to
 “ his proper place.” *

But

* Επει ου τελος τα πραγματα εχει, κη επικειται τα δυναμει, οτι θανατος κη η ζωη, κη ικαστος εις τον ιδιον τοπον μηδεν χωρειν.

Ing. Eipst. ad Mag.

The same mode of expression we meet with, Acts i. 25. And for the proper meaning of the expressions, διεν τοπον, κρισμενος τοπον, χωραν ιουσεων, &c.

See Grotius's Comment, on that Text.

But Polycarp in his prayer, at the stake, expresses himself still more strongly. "O thou God of the whole race of righteous men, who live before thee—among whom may I be received before thee *this day*!" It is plain, that he cannot here mean the state of righteous men in this world, because he was already among them. And it is equally plain, that the society into which he prayed to be admitted immediately after death, could only be what the apostle calls, *the spirits of just men made perfect*; and the state alluded to, the intermediate state.

"After this time, 'that is,' after the time of Justin Martyr, or Irenæus, 'the author tells us,' the doctrine of a direct materialism *crept* into the Christian church; and it is not easy to say from what source it came." I am not a little surprised, that our author should find any difficulty here :

here : since a writer, of whose merit no one has a more advantageous opinion than himself, hath asserted, that “ it was unquestionably the opinion of the apostles and early Christians, that whatever be the nature of the soul, its percipient and thinking powers cease at death.” * Now, if this be not the doctrine of materialism, it is a doctrine so very like it, that I cannot see the point of distinction between them. Why should they think the soul ceased at death, if it was not materially the same with the body? And if it was materially the same with the body, it must cease at death. If the doctrines be distinct, they are at least so strictly united, that you cannot separate them. Knowing, therefore, when *the doctrine of the percipient and thinking powers of the soul, ceasing at death*, obtained in the church; it is very easy to say, when *the doctrine of materialism crept into the church* :

N even

* Author of Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit, p. 224.

even so early, if we believe the author last cited, as the time of the apostles; and, what is still more to the purpose, that author assures us, it was the opinion of the apostles themselves.

But of all those apostles and martyrs, it seems, "Tertullian was the most determined materialist in Christian antiquity."* From this assertion, and the general drift of our author's disquisitions, would a man hesitate to rank Tertullian among the favourers, or even professed champions of the doctrine of the homogeneity of the soul and body? Yet the fact is directly otherwise. Tertullian wrote a treatise professedly *against* that doctrine; contending, that the soul was derived from the breath of God, and not from the organization of matter. † There is a great want of precision

* Disq. p. 205.

† De solo censu animæ congressus Hermogeni, quatenus et istam ex materiæ potius suggestu, quam ex Dei flatu consti-

precision in his use of words, but his general meaning is very intelligible. In opposition to the doctrine of those, who supposed the soul to be *επαυγασμα του Θεου*, an emanation from the Deity, he conceived it to be a kind of attenuated matter: something very different from the body, and yet SOMETHING; and as such, something substantial. And this representation of the opinion of Tertullian, is well supported by the sentiments of Augustine concerning him. "He believed, 'says he' the soul to be corporeal, for no other reason, than because he could form no idea of an *incorporeal substance*: and was therefore afraid, that if it was not body, it was nothing"†

N 2

This

constituisse presumpsit.

Tert. de An. c. 1.

And again, cætera animæ naturalia jam a nobis audiit Hermogenes, cum ipsorum defensione et probatione, per quæ Dei potius quam materiæ propinqua cognoscitur.

Idem de Anim. cap. 22.

† Denique Tertullianus corpus animam esse credidit, non ob aliud nisi quod eam incorpoream cogitare non potuit.

This observation of Augustine, very satisfactorily explains our author's following quotation from Tertullian. *To what did Christ, when he died, descend? To the souls, I presume, of the Patriarchs. But why, if the soul under the earth be a mere nothing? And if it be not body, it is a nothing.*† From this passage, cited by our author, it appears, that Tertullian believed an intermediate state; and that the souls of the patriarchs existed there. And when he used the word *corpus*, it is equally clear, that he affixed to it an idea different from that of gross matter.

He expressly asserts the difference of corporeity between the soul and body: when
he

tuit; et ideo timuit, ne nihil esset, si corpus non esset.

Aug. lib. 10. de Genesi ad Litt. sub Finem.

† Ad quod et Christus moriendo descendit? Puto ad animas patriarcharum. Sed quamobrem, si nihil anima sub terris? Nihil enim, si non corpus.

Tert. de Anim. c. 7. See Disq. p. 205.

he supposes " the mind to be invisible,
 " both on account of the present state of
 " its body, the peculiar property of its sub-
 " stance, and the nature of those objects to
 " which it is invisible." * In short, he con-
 ceived the soul to be a principle distinct
 from the body, of a different nature, and
 in that nature immortal. † Is this the
 voucher for the doctrine adopted by our
 author? Is his the opinion, that the soul
 is the effect of a peculiar organization of
 matter, subsists only with the body, and
 that with the dissolution of the one, the ex-
 istence of the other ceases? Is this *the most*
determined materialist in Christian antiquity?
 We may then fairly conclude, that the com-
 fortable doctrine of the soul's immortality
 is

* Anima est invisibilis, et pro conditione corporis sui,
 et pro proprietate substantiæ, et pro natura etiam eorum
 quibus invisibilis esse sortita est. Tert. de An. c. 8.

† Definimus animam, Dei flatu natam, *immortalem*,
corporalem, &c. Idem de An. cap. 22.

is neither impugned nor invalidated by any of the Christian fathers.

I must not pass by the opinion of Arnobius, who flourished in the fourth century, concerning the nature of the soul, because our author has thought fit to quote his authority. It was not exactly the same with that of Tertullian, nor very different from it. He supposed it to be of, what he terms, a middle quality: neither an excerpction from the Deity, nor homogeneous with the body. And whereas Tertullian asserted it to be in its own nature immortal; Arnobius considers its immortality as a super-addition to its nature, and conferred on it by God; and, as his gift, liable to be withdrawn at his displeasure. He gives his reasons, why he does not conceive it to be strictly immaterial: of which I will only mention one. It is, "because immaterial substances *cannot* be connected with material

“terial ones.” This is the very same argument adopted by our author, who stiles the supposed mutual influence of the soul and body, not a *difficulty*, but an *impossibility*,* happily drest up by him, with a pert allusion to transubstantiation, and the doctrine of the Trinity.

I have now attended my author in his view of the Christian Fathers, down to the fifth century: when he acknowledges the doctrine of the immortality of the soul to have had a settlement. But, on a fair examination, I trust, it hath appeared to have acquired a settlement ever since the beginning of time: and to have been so immoveably fixt, that, though some eccentric geniuses may, at times, have endeavoured to shake it, no efforts have been able to shoulder it out of a single corner of the world.

PART

* Disq. p. 60. See also Refl. p.

"testimony." This is the very same argument adopted by our author, who states the supposed moral influence of the soul and body, and a system, but an empty one, * built up by him, with a poor relation to materialism, and the doctrine of the Trinity.

I have now detailed my author in his view of the Christian Era, down to the fifth century: when he acknowledges the doctrine of the immortality of the soul to have had a religious, but, on a fair examination, I trust, it will appear to have acquired a foundation even later the beginning of time: and to have been to immovably fix, that, though some errors the centuries may, at times, have introduced to it, no effort have been made to throw it out of a single corner of the world.

PART

PART III.

SECTION I.

*Concerning the Author's Application of the
Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul to
the Pre-existence of Christ.*

A pre-existent state can never be proved by such arguments as natural reason supplies. Nor can other, than negative arguments be produced against it. Our memory retains no trace of any transactions in a former state: but it does not therefore follow, that the soul could not in a prior state have existed. A fit of illness will erase from the mind every impression of past occurrences: yet it cannot be asserted, that the mind before and after that illness is not the same. But as revelation is silent about
it,

it, the nature of the subject will rank it among those hidden doctrines, on which the best reasonings are but ingenious reveries.

Our author, however, endeavours to place the doctrine of the soul's pre-existence on equal ground with that of its immortality. He has asserted, that "all the philosophers, who believed the immortality of the soul, believed its pre-existence." * In consequence of so general an assertion, it may not unreasonably be asked, on what ground Xenophon, who undoubtedly believed the immortality of the soul, is supposed to have believed its pre-existence too. Cicero's account of his opinions seems to look quite another way. †

And

* Disq. p. 270.

† *Animum esse immortalem, et eum non apparere; sed ex iis rebus, quas gerit, intelligi, putavit: qui cum omni admittance corporis liberatus, purus et integer esse cepit.*
Cicero de Senect.

And though my author, on the authority of Mrs. Carter, questions Seneca's belief of the immortality of the soul : yet has that philosopher in several places so expressly inculcated the doctrine, that I see not what right we have to doubt his opinion of the truth of it. In his consolation to Marcia, his words are to this purpose very explicit:

“ Why should you run to the sepulchre of
 “ your son ? His worst and most cumber-
 “ some parts indeed are there, his bones and
 “ ashes : which are properly no more the
 “ parts of him, than his cloaths. With-
 “ out leaving any portion of himself on
 “ earth, he hath fled entire, and left us.
 “ And though now hovering perhaps a
 “ little above us, while he purifies himself
 “ from every inherent defect, and shakes
 “ off the dregs of mortality, he will then
 “ mount on high, mingle among happy
 “ souls, and the divine assembly shall re-
 “ ceive him ; the Scipios and Catos, de-
 “ spisers of life, and then only free, when
 “ en-

“enfranchised by the favour of death.” *
Such is his opinion of the immortality of the soul; but I can discover no traits, no vestige, in any part of his works, that directly or indirectly declare his belief in the doctrine of pre-existence.

Averroes and Avicenna, who adopted the system of the anima mundi, though they conceived the soul to be essentially pre-existent, ever supposed it to have its beginning as a separate subsistence, when it first informed the human body.

It

* Proinde non est quod ad sepulchrum filii tui curras? Pessima ejus, et ipsi molestissima istic jacent, ossa cineresque: non magis illius partes, quam vestes, aliaque tegumenta corporis. Integer ille, nihilque in terris relinquens, fugit, et totus excessit: paulumque supra nos commoratus, dum expurgat inhærentia vitia, situmque omnis mortalis ævi excutit, deinde ad excelsa sublatum, inter fœlices currit animas, excipitque illum cætus facer, Scipiones, Catonesque, utique contemptores vitæ, et mortis beneficio liberi.

Sen. Conf. ad Marc. cap. 25.

It would be a very easy matter to prove, that *many* philosophers believed the immortality of the soul; who have not dropped a hint relative to its pre-existence; and therefore, whose belief of this latter doctrine must be merely conjectural. And to justify so round an assertion, as, that "*all*, the philosophers, who believed the immortality of the soul, believed its pre-existence," it is incumbent on the author to produce some reason for so strict and general an union of the two doctrines, as he supposes. I can not, I confess discern, what so necessary dependence the one doctrine can have on the other; nor wherein can consist their so close connexion, that he, who embraces the one, *must* adopt the other also. We acknowledge the soul to have had a beginning: and whether its existence commenced sooner or later, is a point, that neither weakens or supports the doctrine of its immortality. And the subject of the pre-existence of souls, I find introduced

duced on this occasion, only as a link, whereby to connect with *disquisitions on matter*, “a dissertation on the pre-existence of “Christ.” To favour the doctrine of Socinianism, seems to have been a principal object of our author’s labours in the establishment of the doctrine of materialism: for wherever this doctrine *generally* prevails, that of Socinianism he thinks will *immediately* and *universally* follow.* Dr. Price however, is better instructed on this point, than to place a favourite doctrine on such disadvantageous ground; or to acknowledge any alliance between them.†

If the soul of man be homogeneous with his body, it ceases to exist when the eye is closed by death, and had its first existence when the body was formed; therefore the soul of Christ, my author analogically infers, must also have had its first existence with the formation of his body. “How
“ it

* Free Corresp. p. 375.

† Free Corresp. p. 334.

" it may affect others, says he, I can not
 " tell: but with me it is a very great ob-
 " jection to the pre-existence of Christ,
 " that it favours strongly of the original
 " doctrine of the pre-existence of all human
 " souls, which was the foundation of the
 " Gnostic heresy, and the source of great
 " corruption in genuine christianity. For
 " if the soul of one man might have pre-
 " existed, separate from the body, why
 " might not the soul of another, or of
 " all?" *

When he speaks of the *foundation of the
 Gnostic heresy, and the source of the corruption
 of genuine christianity*, he must allude to the
 ancient Gnostics, or those early sectaries who
 were first distinguished by that title; and
 they were in fact not a particular sect: all
 the ancient heretics affected the title of
 Gnostics, the word implying a superiour
 degree of knowledge. They afterwards,
 accordnig

* Disquisition, p. 320.

according to Epiphanius, settled into a distinct sect; for such in his treatise on heresies, he considers them, but not that sect, to which our author alludes: for he does not assert the doctrine of pre-existence to be *the foundation of that heresy*, nor even a distinguishing tenet of the sect. It was the opinion of many of the Platonists, who were some of them called Gnostics: it was the opinion too of many of the Fathers, who were esteemed orthodox. That very Arnobius, cited by our author, on the authority of Beausobre, for so *perfect orthodoxy*, as that of asserting the corporeity and mortality of the human soul,* has declared in favour of the doctrine of a pre-existence of souls. “Are we not,” says he, “indebted to God, first for our being: for that we are called men; for that we are sent by him, or in consequence of a fall, sunk into this darksome habitation of the body?”

* Disq. p. 296.

“dy?”* And I should be glad to know on what authority he so peremptorily asserts the doctrine of a pre-existent state to be an heretical opinion. The scriptures seem silent about it; therefore I should conclude it at worst, a harmless reverie.

But if I object to his assertion, what shall I say to the inference contained in his question? “If the soul of one man might have pre existed, separate from the body, why might not the soul of another, or of all?” I will answer the question by another. If one man could supersede, or suspend the laws of nature, could walk upon the sea, at his bidding raise the dead to life again, why may not another, or all men do these things? The argument from analogy is just as valid in one instance, as the other.



If

* Nonne Deo debemus hoc ipsum primum quod sumus : quod esse homines dicimur ; quod ab eo vel missi, vel lapsi, Cæcitate hujus corporis continemur ?

Amob. adv. Gent L. 1,

If Christ had been endowed with none, but merely human powers, these facts would have been more incredible, than on the supposition of his divinity. But if his conception was supra-human, if “he was introduced into the world, ‘as our author acknowledges,’ without a human father,”* if he derived from on high wisdom and power, surpassing those of man, and displayed them in such acts as *never man* did, no argument from analogy is applicable. The truth of the doctrine must be determined by revelation: how that is managed by the author, so as to be made subservient to his purpose, shall be further examined.

The apostle John, ‘says our author,’ uses “language, that can not be applied to any thing, but the system I have mentioned.”† It is extremely difficult to discover to which part of his system he here alludes. From the

* Disq. p. 319.

† Ib. p. 287.

the former part of this chapter, I should presume it is to the mortality of the soul: from what immediately follows, one would incline to think his allusion is to the perfect humanity of Christ. I will however venture, in contradiction to his assertion, whether it respect the one or the other, to affirm that the apostle John uses no language, which can give the least countenance to either. One general assertion is as good as another. Those passages of scripture, to which he appeals in confirmation of his system, must determine the truth of it. I suppose him to have availed himself of such as are most to his purpose: the force of them therefore shall be fairly discussed,)

He observes, * that no heresies were known in the times of the apostles, except those of Docetæ, and of the Nazarenes and Ebionites. Now the heresy of the Docetæ consisted in believing, that Jesus the Christ

O 2

lived,

* Disq. p. 307.

lived, died, and rose again, not in reality, but in appearance : his apparent body being only a phantasm. The heresy of the Ebionites and Cerinthians distinguished between Jesus, and the Christ. It supposed Jesus to be a mere man, but excelling all others in virtue : that after being baptised, the Christ took possession of him ; and empowered him to perform his great miracles : that when Jesus suffered, the Christ, as being by nature impassible, left him, and returned to heaven.

Substituting the *Logos*, or if they rather please, the *power* and *wisdom* of *God*, for the *Christ*, in the Cerinthian heresy, the Socinians see their own. And from the so great antiquity of that supposed heresy, and no mention having been made of it in the New Testament, as such, our author infers, that it was not considered as any heresy at all.* For “ the other heresy, ‘ adds he, ’
“ is

* Disq. p. 307.

" is inveighed against, and especially by the
 " apostle John in the strongest terms." As
 our author hath not referred us to the pas-
 sages where those *strong terms* are to be
 found, I will take the liberty to produce
 one; which has been generally supposed as
 direct, against the heresies that in his time
 prevailed, as any: and that is, the intro-
 duction to his gospel. And duly weighing
 what those introductory verses assert, the
 contrary tenets must be acknowledged to
 form the heresies against which he writes.

*St. John asserts,
 that,*

*In the beginning was
 the word, and the
 word was with God,
 and the word was God.*

And as if to enforce
 a doctrine that had by
 some been questioned,
 he

*The opposite and here-
 tical Tenets are,*

That the Logos, or
 word, which was in
 the beginning with
 God, was no more
 than the wisdom of
 God; and of course,
 could not be stiled
 God

he repeats it: οὗτος
this very word *was in*
in the beginning with
God. All things were
made by him, and
without him was not
any thing made, that
was made.—And the
word was made flesh,
and dwelt among us.

And this doctrine,
adds the Evangelist,
was confirmed by
John the Baptist, who
allowed him preference
in honour, in
consequence of such
his priority of existence:
He was preferred
above me, for he
*was before me.**

God with any greater
propriety, than the di-
vine justice, or good-
ness, or any other at-
tribute of the deity.

Much less could it
be said that this Lo-
gos ἐγένετο σαρξ became,
or was absolutely made
flesh. This Logos indeed,
or wisdom, did inform
the mind of a virtuous
but mere man, named
Jesus, in the same
manner, in which o-
ther men are made
wise, only in a greater,
degree.

Nor can it be ad-
mitted, that this flesh

re-

* Πρωτος μὴ must allude to priority of time, and not
to rank and dignity: because, according to this latter in-
terpretation,

represented to have been so miraculously constituted such, had any existence before John, who was born some months before him.

I have little doubt that the evangelist directed those passages against the errors, that had in his time obtained: I have no doubt at all, that a principal object of that apostle's gospel

terpretation, the passage would be scarcely sense. The construction would be, *he was preferred in rank and dignity before me, &c.*, because, *he was in rank and dignity before me.* This would be giving a reason for an assertion by repeating it, or proving an idem per idem.

The words *γενόμεν ὑμῶν πρότερον* μὲν, signify, "he was before me," and the meaning of the passage at large is plainly this, "he was preferred above me in office and appointment here, because he was in priority of existence before me." And thus interpreted the words directly apply to those heretics, who denied that Jesus was pre-existent to John,

gospel and epistles was to ascertain the pre-existence and divinity of Christ, against the heresy of the Cerinthians. His aversion to that heresy may be in some measure estimated by his avowed aversion to Cerinthus : which was so great, that we are informed by an anecdote of St. Jerom, that “ designing to go into a bath at Ephesus, but learning Cerinthus was within, he went immediately away, saying to those who were with him ; *let us fly from hence, lest the bath fall, in which is Cerinthus, the enemy of the truth.*”*

The error of the docetæ was much less pernicious than that of the Cerinthians : they conceived so highly of the Saviour of mankind, that they could not believe he would condescend so low as to subject himself to the weakness and infirmities of human nature. While these held him, who declared to them, that he *came down from heaven,*

* Hieron, Dial, Adv, Luciferian.

heaven, that he enjoyed glory with the Father, before the world was, &c.* in no better light than a Socrates, or a Cicero: and wrest his own words, which are plain and obvious, imply no shadow of contradiction or inconsistency with his other declarations; to a figurative, forced, and foreign sense; rather than give him the honour he demands.

The flat, jejune, frivolous interpretation of the introduction to St. John's gospel, to which the system of the Socinians compels them, sufficiently reprobates it. I will take it from the pen of our author.

“ It is to the same oriental philosophy;
 “ that for my part, I have little doubt that
 “ this apostle, who certainly referred to it
 “ in

* In order to elude the force of this text, Joh. iii. 13. Socinus supposed Christ to have taken a journey to heaven after his baptism; to have returned to earth again, and entered upon his ministry.

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“ in his epistles, alluded also in the intro-
 “ duction to his gospel : where (in direct
 “ opposition to the principles of this philo-
 “ sophy, which supposed that the *λοφος*,
 “ which made the world, was a being dis-
 “ tinct from God) he explains what the
 “ *λοφος* really means; as when it is said in
 “ the Old Testament, that *the world was*
 “ *made by it*, viz. the wisdom and power of
 “ God himself, and nothing that was dis-
 “ tinct from him.”* The author will give
 me leave to observe, that the *λογος*,
 by whose efficiency the evangelist declares
 that *God made the world*, he as absolutely
 declares, *was made flesh*. And the apostle to
 the Colossians speaks of Christ in the same
 terms; as that Being, *in whom all things*
were created, that are in heaven, and that are
on earth :† *that very Being, in whom we have*
redemption, through his blood, even the re-
mission of sins. Now, as I have no idea, nor
 can

* Disq. p. 219.

† Disquisition, p. 219.

can form any, of the *blood* of the wisdom and power of God; I must suppose the Being to which both the apostles allude, to be the *λογος*, afterwards *made* flesh, and existing in Jesus Christ.

I ask pardon of the author, for having a little interrupted him in his exposition of the verses introductory to St. John's gospel; but will return to the point where I left him, which was his elucidation of the evangelist's meaning in the word *λογος*; it is, he informs us, *the wisdom and power of God himself*: and thus proceeds. " *In the beginning, says he, [John] was the λογος,*
" *as the philosophers also said; but the*
" *λογος was with God; that is, it was*
" *God's own λογος, or his attribute; so*
" *that the λογος was really God himself.*
" *This divine power and energy was always*
" *with God, always belonged to him, and*
" *was inherent in him.*" * Such is our
author's

* Disq. p. 270.

author's exposition of this passage. Now substituting for the word *λογος*, our author's own interpretation of it, the propriety of his explanation will be the more striking. "In the beginning was the wisdom and power of God." Most indisputably true. "And the wisdom and power of God was with God." So true this, and so clear, that one would think it might have been known without the information of an evangelist. "And the power and wisdom of God was God." That I will not hesitate to pronounce absolutely false. For the power and wisdom of God being, as our author has already granted, only the attributes of God; it is impossible that the attributes should be the subject of those attributes; or, that the attributes, and the subject of them, should be one and the same subsistence.

Pass we from the beginning of St. John's gospel to the beginning of his first epistle :
which

which our author produces, as being particularly directed against the errors of the docetæ. 1 John, i. 1. "That which was
 " from the beginning, *which we have heard,*
 " *which we have seen with our eyes, which*
 " *we have looked upon, and our hands have*
 " *handled, of the word of life. For the life*
 " *was manifested, and we have seen it, and*
 " *bear witness, and shew unto you that eter-*
 " *nal life* which was with the Father, and
 " was manifested unto us." * If in this
 passage, John bears testimony to the reality of Christ's body against the docetæ; he as expressly asserts his pre-existence against the Ebionites and Cerinthians. And it is one of the many instances that may be produced in proof of what has been already asserted; that both in his gospel and epistles, the evangelist had it constantly in view, to guard against both these heresies.

Where

* Disq. p. 287.

Where St. Paul, in his epistle to the Colossians, speaks of "*the wisdom of words,*" "*worldly wisdom,*" "*philosophy,*" and "*vain deceit:*" if our author, in that *specious, Oriental* system of philosophy, against which he supposes the apostle in those words to inveigh, include the doctrine of the immortality of the soul: that this doctrine was specious, I allow, for it was embraced by the whole world; but that it could properly be stiled Oriental, a term which he frequently applies to it, I as firmly deny. It may with equal propriety be denominated Occidental, or derive its epithet from which other quarter of the world he pleases. It is a doctrine that extends from pole to pole; and from east to west, encompasses the whole habitable globe. And the universality of this doctrine, our author has not advanced a single argument, to disprove.

But,

But, indeed, there is not any insinuation dropt either in this epistle, or in any other of St. Paul's writings, against the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. There is not the least room for supposing, this was the *philosophy* and *vain deceit* the apostle had in view. The resurrection of a body, crumbled into dust, dispersed in various places, and deserted by the soul, which was either suffering in Tartarus, or rejoicing in Elysium; winging the air on harnessed clouds, or bemoaning its crimes in dark and squalid dungeons, might appear incredible to those, who looked with prejudice on a novel doctrine, and would not be easily induced to believe what their reason could not comprehend. This could only be known by revelation; and this was the doctrine against which was levelled the specious ridicule of wordy sophists. They required to know *how* a corrupted, perished mass of matter could be restored to symmetry and beauty,

beauty, and be made a fit habitation for an immortal soul: and in derision asked, what would be the nature of the renovated body. *How are the dead raised up; and with what body do they come?* Their senses convinced them, that the body after death putrified and mouldered away; and they pressed the apostles with philosophical reasonings against the identity of a body so disarranged, and raised again. And St. Paul's caution in this epistle, extends to such sophistical reasonings of the Gentile philosophers, as well as to the inherent prejudices of Jewish zealots. The *vain deceit*, here spoken of, very properly alludes to the bigotted notions of the one, in favour of their rites and traditions, and particularly the idea they had entertained of their Messiah, as being merely and absolutely man; and *wordly wisdom* applies with equal propriety to the fanciful opinions and wordy sophistical reasonings of the philosophizing Greeks. These different prejudices, retained

retained by several of the respective converts from Judaism and Gentile philosophy, soon grew into settled doctrines; and so early as even in the time of the apostles constituted the two sects of the Ebionites or Cerinthians, and the Docetæ.

SECTION II.

Remarks on certain general Arguments, advanced against the Pre-existence of Christ.

IT has been with controversial divines, a constant subject of complaint against each other, that, instead of forming their opinions on texts of scripture, they adopt a system; and then

“ —Addicti jurare in verba magistri,”

force by strained interpretations both prophets and apostles into their party. A very

P

slender

slender acquaintance with Socinian writers will evince this to be in an eminent degree their practice. But if the scriptures may be wrested from their primary and proper meaning, to a figurative and foreign sense, according to the caprice of every system-monger; no one can properly stile them a rule either of faith or practice. For there is scarcely even a moral precept, much less an article of doctrine, that may not be refined into various significations, till the true and primary meaning be frittered away.

Our author in his first general argument asserts, that "John and the rest of the apostles always speak of Christ as a man, even when they represent him in a light of the greatest importance." On the contrary, though *Christ was found in fashion as a man*, and subjected to all the infirmities and affections of human nature; yet that there was in him a principle of individuation,

duration, that distinguished him from mere man, is, I think evidently noted in many texts: such as, where contrasting himself with the rest of mankind, he tells his audience, John, viii. 23. *Ye are of this world, I am not of this world: ye are from beneath, I am from above.*—When he is represented, as *knowing men's thoughts.*—Where St. Paul speaks of not having received his commission to preach the gospel from *man*, but from *Jesus Christ*; Gal. i. 12, and the like. But that he was by nature more than man, is an assertion, I more especially ground on his præter-natural conception. He was, to use my author's own words, “introduced into the world without a human Father;” the energetic power of the most high producing him in a manner different from the production of all other men. This is that mystery which I presume not to pry into, farther than is revealed to me: so far

is revealed, and my author admits it. And, this granted, it would appear more extraordinary to me, that a mere man, than that something *more than a prophet*, should from such an origin be derived.

Pity it is, that so much industry as our author displays in repeated efforts to remove from the Ebionites the opprobrium of heresy, should be attended with no little success. He asks, "whether it was more probable that the *illiterate* Jews, who received their doctrine from none but the apostles themselves, and *indeed conversed with no other*, should have fallen into so grievous an error with respect to the person of Christ, their own Messiah; or those, who are known to have drawn various opinions from other sources, besides the genuine apostolical doctrine, and particularly from that very philosophy, which, manifestly contrary to any thing that the Jews could possibly have learned

“learned from their sacred books, expressly taught the doctrine of the pre-existence of all human souls, and their emanation from the divine mind; which was in fact the doctrine and language of the pretended orthodox fathers?”* And then immediately adds. “Without examining the merits of the question, *probability* will certainly incline us to take the part of the poor Jewish converts.”

Without examining the merits of the question; a sober reasoner would think it *temerity*, to determine on either side. And on a free examination of its merits, I can not but observe, that it is very improperly stated. Why are the illiterate Jews represented to have conversed with none but the apostles? Are we to suppose they never conversed with their unconverted brethren? Do we not know, that no men were more wedded to

* Disq. p. 309 and 310.

to their prejudices and opinions, than that people: none more furious in supporting those opinions against novel doctrines; equally indefatigable in making profelytes, and guarding against conversion to christianity. Why are we to suppose these men to have laid aside all the prejudices of education, and implicitly to have resigned themselves up to the instruction of the apostles: and those, whose minds were informed with science, and enlarged with liberal sentiments, when, on a clear conviction of the truth of it, they embraced christianity, not to have been more able, as well as more solicitous, accurately to inform themselves of the articles of that faith they had received, than a set of *illiterate* Jews. As to them being *illiterate*, their advocate could not have stamped on them a stronger suspicion of bigotry, than by characterising them as destitute of literature. Hence on a fair state of the question, I can not but conclude,

clude, that there is equal, or even greater reason to conclude, that the opinions of the Ebionites and Nazarenes were heretical, than those of the Platonising Gnostics. And the doctrinal documents of the evangelist, seem to be more particularly directed against the other, than these.

Our author's second general argument is deduced from the opinion, the Jews had entertained of their Messiah. "It is evident," says he, that they expected nothing more than a mere man for their Messiah." And it is equally true, that they believed their Messiah would be a great and victorious prince; and that the salvation to be wrought by him, would be the redemption of the Jewish nation from the Roman yoke, and its establishment as an independent and illustrious empire. Thus the *sign* they required of him, was not a mere miracle, it was not the sign of the prophet Jonas, but it was,

was, as their historian observed, σημεῖον
 ἐλευθερίας,* some sign of power and abi-
 lity to effect their liberty. That their be-
 lief in him as a great prince was false, his
 history evinces: yet that he was by the pro-
 phets prefigured, as a character of consum-
 mate greatness, is undeniable. But the
 Jews mistook the point, in which his great-
 ness should consist; they supposed it mun-
 dane and temporal; whereas it was spiritual
 and divine. And to correct this erroneous
 judgment, was a principal object of St.
 John's gospel: a truth this, which affords
 a key that will explain many difficulties in
 it. If therefore we were to estimate the
 character of the Messiah, according to the
 opinion the Jews entertained of him, Jesus
 Christ could not have been their Messiah.
 If he were their Messiah, the opinion they
 entertained of him was false: and our au-
 thor's argument, founded upon the truth of
 their

* Joseph, de Bell. Jud. l. ii. c. 13.

their opinion, cannot be admitted of any weight.

His third, fourth, and fifth arguments rest on the supposition, that "no positive declaration of Christ's superior nature is to be found in scripture."* It is acknowledged, that Matthew, Mark, and Luke, have not so directly declared it, as St. John: and in consequence of that, the Cerinthian heresy taking place, the last-mentioned evangelist has been very express in asserting it. See John i. 1, 2, &c. iii. 13, 31. vi. 38, 51. xvii. 5. &c. &c. To affirm that no positive declaration of it is to be found in scripture, is begging the question: and an argument, founded on such an assertion, would be most properly answered, by an absolute denial of it.

When our Saviour himself assures us,
*that he enjoyed glory with the Father, before
 this*

* Disq. p. 313.

this world was called into existence; and, in distinction of the superiority of his nature, above the rank of men, tells them, they are from beneath, he is from above: I must either acknowledge these expressions, and many others of like import, significant of Christ's superiour nature, or calculated to mislead the judgment of the plain and simple-minded. I know not what the author means by positive declaration, if these declarations of our Lord himself do not amount to it. The doctrine of Christ's superior nature, implies no impossibility: and if the obvious import of a variety of passages declare it, I see sufficient reason to believe it. And if sufficient reason be afforded us, for believing a fact; no argument will lie against the truth of that fact, from its not being made more than sufficiently clear to us.

“ But it weighs much with me, ‘ says
 “ our author,’ that had such a doctrine been
 “ true

“ true, it must have appeared in the course
 “ of the history of Christ, that such an ex-
 “ traordinary measure was necessary.” Does
 he not, in the ebullition of his own conceit,
 here present us with a copy of that *philoso-*
phy, and *worldly wisdom*, against which, the
 apostle, as we have just observed, cautions
 his new christian converts? What, if on
 the authority of scripture, a fact be ascer-
 tained; am I to withhold my assent to it,
 because it is not declared to me *why* it is so;
 and further proved to me, that it must *ne-*
cessarily have been so, and could not have
 been otherwise. With regard to the neces-
 sity, or expediency of such a fact; as is now
 before us; if by scripture authority, I be
 determined in opinion that it is so, I am
 without other arguments abundantly con-
 vinced, that it is necessary or expedient, that
 it should be so; and I can conceive no
 stronger argument in proof of the expedi-
 ency of such a fact, than the fact itself.

“ Could

“ Could Matthew and Luke, ‘ says my
 “ author,’ who wrote so fully on the mira-
 “ culous conception of Jesus, have over-
 “ looked the circumstance of his superior
 “ nature, had it been known to them ?” *
 And could they have inculcated the doc-
 trine of his superior nature more abso-
 lutely, than, in the account they give of his
 miraculous conception, they have done ?
 Instead of a human father, he was pro-
 duced by the energetic power of the most
 High. πνευμα αγιον επελευσεται, η δυ-
 ναμις υψιστη επισκιασει σοι* and there-
 fore, adds the Evangelist, “ the Holy Thing,
 which shall from thence be produced, shall
 be † the Son of God.” In the ordinary
 course of nature, the production must par-
 take of the nature of the producing cause :
 and,

* Disq. p. 316.

† κληθσεται for ισται. See the Bishop of Rochester’s
 Commentary, and note on this passage.

and, if the Evangelist hath not declared, that notwithstanding such supra-natural production, he was a mere and absolute man, we must acknowledge him to have been something more than man; independent of his own repeated assertions, that he was so, and a life that proved him such.

Our author's two next arguments proceed, the one on a supposition, that, unless Jesus was mere man, there would be no room for that reward and recompence, which the scriptures mention in consequence of his humiliation; and the other on an assertion, that the scriptures expressly say, his apostles will in a future state, be advanced to similar, if not equal, honour.*

In regard to the first, it is to be observed, that all the recompence which our Saviour seems to claim, is a repossession of that state of glory, which he enjoyed with
the

* Disq. p. 316 and 317.

the Father from the beginning. Now, Father, do thou glorify me with thyself, with that glory which I had with thee before the world existed. John xvii. 5.

“The nature of a suffering Saviour’s re-
wards, the Arians, ‘says my author,’
‘must strain hard to explain.’ I cannot
but think, the Socinian must strain much
harder, to explain, or even to conceive,
how a mere man could, by three years mi-
nistry on earth, merit such exceedingly
high privileges, as Christ is in scripture,
represented to have obtained: being ex-
alted far above all principalities, and powers,
and might, and dominion, and every name
that is named, not only in this world, but also
in that which is to come. Eph. i. 21. And
this rank and dignity too, we are told, he
hath by inheritance obtained. Heb. i. 4. I
see not, for my own part, that it requires
any great stretch of mind, on the Arian
scheme,

scheme, to conceive, that high as Christ might have been in his pre-existent state, he might, in his final and glorified state, be advanced higher. For who shall set bounds to Omnipotence in any act, that implies no contradiction?

As to the assertion, that the apostles of Christ are frequently represented as on a level with himself; and that many passages expressly say, they will be advanced to *similar* if not *equal* honor: the very words, adduced by our author in proof of such equality, militate strongly against it. The passages he has cited, taken from the seventeenth chapter of St. John's gospel, are as follow: *That they may be one, as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they may be one in us—And the glory which thou gavest me, I have given them; that they may be one, even as we are one. I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one; and that*
the

the world may know that thou hast sent me, and hast loved them as thou hast loved me. The unity alluded to in this passage, is evidently a unity of design and operation, in the conduct of man's redemption. And so far from declaring his disciples on a level with our Lord, the words plainly assert their inferiority to him : in as much as he, who gives glory, is superior to him, to whom he gives it. " Other parts " of this remarkable prayer, ' adds our " author,' are in the same strain." I will for the satisfaction of my reader, subjoin one of those parts alluded to. *I have given unto them the words, which thou gavest to me : and they have received them, and have known surely, that I came out from thee, and they believed that thou didst send me.* Is there no different degree of honour in being the immediate delegate of God, sent to reveal his will to men, and one of those to whom the revelation was made, and who acknowledge it? Is there no different degree of honour

honour in being the immediate delegate of God, sent to reveal his will to men, and one of those to whom the revelation was made, and who acknowledged it? Is there no different degree of honour implied in receiving a kingdom, and being appointed to employ of honour in that kingdom by him, who received it? When the author has answered in the negative these questions, and others of similar import, with which it would be unnecessary now to press him, he will give some credit to his assertion, and weight to the argument that may be founded on it.

An eighth argument he forms on a passage, 1 Cor. xv. 24, wherein the kingdom of Christ is said to have an end. *Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the father. And when all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the son also himself be subject unto him,*

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him, that put all things under him, that God may be all in all. " This, ' says he, ' is " what we should hardly have expected, if " Christ had been the first of all created " beings, by whom all things were made, " and who upholds and governs all things." How the termination of Christ's kingdom should depend on the date of his first existence, it is not easy to conceive. It is sufficient to draw up the author's argument in form, to expose the weakness of it. ' If Christ existed before the world, his kingdom must ' continue to all eternity: but the scriptures ' assure us, that of Christ's kingdom there ' will be an end; therefore he could not ' have existed before the world.' When the economy of man's redemption shall be compleated, and Christ's mediatorial kingdom of course cease: doth it follow, that Christ shall cease to exist, and in an eternal weight of glory? But had he proved, not only that Christ's kingdom, but that Christ himself

himself should after a certain period cease to exist, his argument would even in that case have been inconclusive against his pre-existence: for from existence ever so early, be it short of eternal, we can not infer eternal duration.

In the argument next advanced by him, the first takes for granted, which by the bye he ought to have proved, before he built an argument upon it, that human souls did not exist in a state prior to this, and from thence infers, that the soul of Christ could not have pre-existed: analogy requiring, "that the whole species be upon one footing, in a case which so very nearly concerns the first and constituent principles of their nature." This argument hath been already noticed; * and I will therefore only further observe, that the particular case, with which he has qualified it, will

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* Refl. p. 112 and 114.

avail him little; for *in the first and constituent principles* of nature, Christ differed from the rest of mankind; being produced, as my author has granted, by the efficiency of the holy spirit, and without a human father.

His tenth argument in proof of Christ's absolute and real humanity, is founded on Heb. ii. 9. *We see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels, for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honour.* The original is, *τον δε βραχυ τι παρ' αγγελους ηλαττωμενον ελεπομεν Ιησουν, διχ το πα-
λημα του θανατε.* and the literal translation, *for we see Jesus, who was for a little time lessened below the angels, for, or by, or on account of the suffering of death.* The word *ηλαττωμενον*,* is very significant of his superiour existence in a prior state. And
I leave

* Grece non dicitur ηλαττουσθαι, nec Latine imminui, nisi qui deteriore sit conditione quam antea.

Vid. Bezam. in Loc.

I leave my author in full possession of every advantage he can make of this passage: in firm persuasion that he could not easily have hit on a text, that is more directly against him.

The three next arguments, advanced, by him against the doctrine of Christ's pre-existence, are founded on the frailties of his nature in a state of manhood: he having felt as we feel, and been tempted and tried as we are. In his infantile state, that he experienced the imbecillity both of body and mind, which is common to infants, the evangelist Luke leaves us no room to doubt; when he informs us, he *increased in wisdom and stature*. Upon this passage observes our author, "I have no idea of such an increase of wisdom, as the evangelist here ascribes to him,"* on the supposition, he means, of his having existed in a prior state, and superior station. I really can not help his want

* Disq. p. 324.

want of ideas; but will tell him what the scriptures say on this point, and perhaps they will supply his wants.

The apostle to the Philippians, c. ii. v. 6. says of Christ, that *εν μορφη Θεου υπαρχων, εαυτον εκενωσεν, μορφην δουλαιων.* The word *μορφη*,* as used by the best writers, signifies not only the external form or surface, but the whole substance, and essential nature. And such it must mean in the passage before us; the word in any other sense being unapplicable to God. According to this interpretation then of the word *μορφη*, the meaning of the passage is plain and obvious: [Christ] ‘who, when he was of divine nature and essence, emptied ‡ himself, taking the nature of a servant’.†

Let

* See Hammond on the passage.

‡ The word *κενωσεν* in this place, is very expressive of the act of divesting himself of his glory.

† i. e. of man, and in the lowest circumstances of human nature.

Let us next examine how this passage of St. Paul corresponds with what the evangelist John hath said on the same subject: for it is certain scripture is the best comment on scripture. John, i. 1. ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος.—καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο. * The word that was with God, and * that was God, became flesh.*

Now if the Logos, which the evangelist says *was God*, and the apostle says *was of the nature and essence of God*, according to that evangelist, *became, or was made flesh*, and, according to that apostle, *took the nature of man*: he took with it all the infirmities and affections of human nature; and must necessarily have experienced the imbecillity of infancy, and the increase of the powers of body and mind.

If it be questioned, in the language of Christ's sceptical visiter, *how these things can be?*

be? How such an absolute conversion of the Logos into manhood could be effected? I ingenuously answer, I can not explain it. But it is expressly asserted: and where the assertion implies no impossibility, I may upon sufficient authority believe a fact, though I can neither explain, nor account for it. And I have the assurance of an apostle, that *great is the mystery of godliness, God manifest in the flesh*: as such, I acknowledge it, without endeavouring to pry into secrets, perhaps known only to God himself; or, with the key of human knowledge, to lay open that, which the spirit of God hath declared a mystery.

To guard against any stress that might be laid on a passage in the Hebrews, where it is said, *Christ himself took flesh and blood*; the author tells us, that μετεχω does not imply any choice, for that the word is used for partaking and sharing without any choice.

Christ

Christ is represented, sometimes as *taking upon him* flesh and blood; sometimes as *being made* flesh; sometimes as *raising himself* from the dead; sometimes as *being raised*: intimating, as I apprehend, the will of Christ, in union with the power of God, the exertion of that power being sometimes attributed to Christ, who repeatedly declares he acted by a delegated power; and sometimes to God, from whom it originated. By *partaking*, or *sharing with choice*, I presume the author means *voluntarily partaking* or *sharing in*: for this is all the meaning required to give the word in this place that force, of which it is the object of his criticism to deprive it. And *μετεχειν* *particeps esse*, I will take upon me to say, does generally imply a voluntary participation: it does, 1 Cor. ix. 12. and x. 17 and 30. However, there are so many other passages in scripture, which plainly declare Christ's humiliation to have been a voluntary act; that the import
of

of the word in this place is scarcely worth a dispute.

Even the word next introduced by our author, as a subject of criticism, is one instance of the truth of my assertion. The word is ἐπιλαμβάνειν; which, he says, ought not to have been translated *to take*, but *to lay bold on*. When applied to χειρὸς, Mark, viii. 23. It would be properly translated *to take hold on*; to λόγου, Luke, xx. 20. *to lay bold on*; to αἰωνίου ζωῆς, 1 Tim. vi. 12 and 19. *to secure to one's self*; to σπέρματος Ἀβραάμ, in the passage before us, *to take upon him*: and yet though the idiom of the English language requires this variation of phrase in the different translations, the meaning of the word is in every passage the same. Adverting to the purpose, for which the word μετέχω, was by my author introduced, I beg leave to ask him, whether μεταλαμβάνομαι does not in this passage signify a voluntary

luntary participation. His interpretation of the passage, appears to me forced and unnatural; but I submit it to the reader in his own words. "Christ did not (after he appeared in the character of the Messiah) lay hold upon, so as to *interpose in favour of*, or *rescue* angels, but the seed of Abraham."* The author must understand, *lapsed angels*; for the angels, that kept their first state, wanted no *rescue*. And of *lapsed angels*, the apostle had made no mention, nor seemed to intend any allusion to them: yet to regard the state of the *lapsed angels*, this passage is, I know, generally understood. But it seems not to be the drift either of the passage, or its context, to distinguish the *Beings redeemed*, but the humiliated state of the *redeemer*. The antithesis is not between the redemption of *angels*, and the redemption of mankind; but between the nature of angels, and the nature of

* Disq. p. 325.

of man, which Christ assumed. Therefore I rather conceive the meaning of the passage to be, 'that, in effecting the great work of man's redemption, Christ did not appear in the world in a superior and angelic nature, but took on him the nature of man in the lineage of Abraham.'

In our author's fifteenth argument, he seems to have lost sight of the present point of controversy, which is not, whether Christ was man, but whether he did not exist in a state prior to this his state of humanity. That he was man, we are perfectly agreed; the inspired writers have established this truth beyond dispute. The Evangelist says, *himself took our infirmities, and bore our sicknesses; and the Apostle, that he was touched with the feeling of our infirmities. He increased in wisdom and stature,; he was tempted like as we are; he was hungry and weary; he grieved and wept.* The only point of dispute is, whether Christ did exist in a prior state, and superior nature; whether

whether he was made flesh, whether he really was the son of man, that came down from Heaven; and this is a point which the fifteenth argument does not touch.

Our author's next argument consists of a quotation from his own works, and what of argument there is in it, militates against him. "The consideration," says he in this "extract," of the love of Christ, hath something in it peculiarly endearing, when it is "not considered as the same thing with the "love of the Creator towards his creatures; "but as the love of one, who notwithstanding his miraculous birth, was as much a "man as Adam was, or as we ourselves are; "when it is considered as the love of our "elder brother, &c. &c." * *A fortiori* how must our gratitude be raised, and our love heightened, when we consider that he who died and suffered so much for us, was a divine

* Disq. p. 317.

vine being, who came down from Heaven, to rescue us from the miserable state into which we were plunged, who voluntarily τὸ ἔσχατον for a little time left the abode of happiness, and suffered such a degradation of state and nature *on our account* !

Not to derogate from the value of our author's publications, many of which have great merit, his frequent quotations from them, put me in mind of an anecdote of the celebrated Dr. Bentley ; who used to say, he intended to devote the latter part of his life to the reading of his own works.

Our author's seventeenth argument is addressed to the Arians. He affirms it be “ now
“ agreed both by the Arians and Socinians,
“ that the supreme God is the only object
“ of prayer : * and on this assertion he
grounds

* Disq. p. 329.

grounds the following argument: 'if all prayer, upon the plan of revelation, be confined to the God supreme; God himself is alone the immediate maker of the world, and it is he himself, who constantly supports and governs it, without the mediation of any such glorious though derived being, as the Arians imagine Christ to have been before his incarnation.' The author may be a competent judge of the Socinian creed: but in the early ages of the church, before the names either of Arius or Socinus were heard of, it was the practice of Christians to address prayers to Christ. Pliny, who had taken great pains accurately to inform himself of their tenets, writes, in a letter to the Emperor, "that the extent of their guilt appeared on their own confession to be this; that they used on a stated day to assemble, before it was light, and address a hymn to Christ as a deity, &c." ‡

The

‡ Affirmabant autem hanc fuisse summam vel culpam, vel erroris, quod essent soliti stato die ante lucem

The Arians too paid this tribute to their Redeemer. Origen, whose opinions concerning Christ border nearly on those, that were afterwards termed Arian, asserts, in his controversy with Celsus, that the Christians offered up their prayers and adorations both to the supreme God, and the son; observing a difference in the object of them, and addressing one, as the God supreme, and the other as our mediator and advocate.* Dr. Clayton, bishop of Clogher, whom, I presume, our author will admit to have been an Arian, asserts, divine homage to be due not only to the son, but to the holy

convenire; carmenque Christo, quasi deo, dicere secum invicem, &c. Pl. ep. L. 10. E. 97.

* Αλλα τον ενα Θεον, κ' τον ενα υιον αυτου, κ' λογον, κ' εικονα ταις κατα το δυνατον ημιν ικεσαις, κ' αξιωσεισιν σιδομεν, προσαγοντες τω Θεω των ολων τας ευχας δια των μονογονιους αυτου· ω πρωτον προσφερομεν αυτας, αξιουντες αυτον, ιλασμον οντα των αμαρτιων ημων, προσαγαγειν ως αρχιερα κ' ευχας κ' τας θυσιας κ' τας εντεξεις ημων τω επι πασι Θεω. Orig. centr. Cels. lib. 8.

holy spirit, † under certain restrictions, regarding their respective relations to us. Our homage, he considers as due to the son on a different account, from that admitted by Origen: viz. “because *all judgment is committed to him*; this, ‘he adds,’ being the “great obligation of all duty.” § That learned and able divine too Dr. Clarke, I make no doubt, he will rank in the same class; and to his scripture doctrine of the trinity, * I refer him, in proof that he was of a very different opinion.

The eighteenth argument is directed against the doctrine of the Trinity, a doctrine very foreign to the present controversy; and against which the author advances, little more than a general assertion, that it is “a doctrine which both Jews and Mahometans regard as equally absurd and impious.”

R He

† Essay on spirit, p. 112. § Ib. p. 101.

* Clarke's script. doct. of the Tr. p. 338.

He has asserted, that “ external evidence
 “ is nothing more than conditional evi-
 “ dence with respect to Christianity, going
 “ upon the supposition that the things to
 “ be proved by miracles are not incre-
 “ dible in themselves.” With deference,
 I conceive external evidence, to be much
 more than he represents it. External evidence
 is of weight, where the things to be prov-
 ed by miracles are not *in themselves impossible*.
 A thing, that is not impossible, may appear
 in itself *incredible* : and the external evidence
 be notwithstanding proportionably more co-
 gent, than the supposed incredibility of it.

The Doctrine of the Trinity is by the
 Trinitarians themselves very differently un-
 derstood. And in the opinion, that there
 are three divine subsistences concerned in the
 œconomy of man’s redemption, I can see
 nothing either impious or absurd : I hold it
 an article of faith, that might by a Christian
 be admitted, were there not another text in
 proof

proof of it, except that single one from St. Mathew, xxviii. 19. *go and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.*

The last general argument adduced by our author against the pre-existence of Christ, is founded on the improbability of “a man, who died on the cross, having been the maker of the world.” It is improbable too, that a man, who died on the cross, should, after his death and burial, revive, and rise from the grave, and, in embodied form and substance, eat and drink with his friends, converse freely with them forty days, and after that, ascend openly before their eyes into heaven. These are improbabilities, and require the confirmation of scripture. On that ground I place my foot: for, on subjects so elevated, in abstruse reasonings, and metaphysical subtleties, I find no satisfaction, and I see no end.

The first of arguments adduced by
our author against the pre-existence of Christ,
is founded on the impossibility of "a man,
who died on the cross, having been the
"author of the world." It is impossible,
too, that a man, who died on the cross,
should, after his death and burial, revive,
and rise from the dead, in embodied
form, and lastly, and drink with his
friends, converse with them thirty
days, and after that period of thirty
days, rise into heaven. These are mere
fables, and require the contradiction of
Scripture. On the ground I place my foot:
the on which is elevated, is a solid
foundation, and metaphysical foundation,
and I like no end.

44529A

A P P E N D I X:
CONTAINING
A V I E W
OF A
CORRESPONDENCE
BETWEEN
DR. PRIESTLEY AND DR. PRICE,
ON THE
SUBJECT OF MATERIALISM:
AS FAR AS THAT CORRESPONDENCE AFFECTS THE
PRECEDING REFLECTIONS.

APPENDIX:

CONTAINING

A. V. E. W.

OF A

CORRESPONDENCE



DA. P. R. E. S. T. D. P. R. I. C. E.

SUBJECT OF MATHEMATICS

IN THE YEAR 1885

BY THE EDITOR

A P P E N D I X.

IT is not my intention, in the short view I mean to offer of the Correspondence, which has passed between the Doctors Priestly and Price, on the subject of Materialism, to pass my opinion on the merits of it; or to enquire, how far it has tended to elucidate the subject, or ascertain the true opinion. After much pains taken on both sides, we find each, unconvicted by the arguments of the other, remain perfectly satisfied of the truth of the doctrine they respectively maintained. The few observations, in which I am anticipated by Dr. Price, I submit to the reader, with Dr. Priestley's answers to them.

It has, "in Reflections, * &c." been supposed, on the authority of Sir Isaac Newton, that the first principles of things, must have been solid and indiscerpible.

Dr. Price observes, that "matter, if it
" be any thing at all, must consist of solid
" particles

* Reflections on Materialism, p. 5.

“ particles or atoms occupying a certain
 “ portion of space, and therefore extended,
 “ but at the same time simple and uncom-
 “ pounded, and incapable of being resolved
 “ into any other smaller particles; and it
 “ must be the different form of these primary
 “ particles, and their different combina-
 “ tions and arrangement, that constitute the
 “ different bodies and kinds of matter in
 “ the universe—This seems to have been
 “ Sir Isaac Newton’s idea of matter. See
 “ his Optics, p. 375, &c.” †

To this Dr. Priestley replies, that “ solid
 “ atoms, or monads of matter, can only
 “ be hypothetical things; and till we can
 “ either touch them, or come at them some
 “ way or other, by actual experiment, I
 “ cannot be obliged to admit their exis-
 “ tence.” *

Dr. Price has sometimes charged his an-
 tagonist with writing below himself. In the
 preceding

† Free Correspondence, p. 10.

* Ibid. p. 46.

preceding observation, it must be candidly acknowledged, he is pressed into a declaration unguarded, and unworthy of him. * Those, who believe, there is nothing but what they can handle—and that there is no particle of substance but what they can see,† Plato ranks among the *μαλ' ἐν ἀμύστοις*. Dr. Priestley's arguments against the solidity and indiscernibility of matter, go to the absolute exclusion of matter from the universe. For either matter is something solid; or it is nothing.

It is asserted, “Reflections, &c.” † that Dr. Priestley has supposed the Deity to be *in a degree* material.

Dr. Price says, “it seems evident that”
 “Dr. Priestley's principles go to prove,
 “that the Deity is material, as well as all
 “inferior beings. He would otherwise have
 “no common property with matter, by
 “which

† *Refle. on Mat.* p. 57.

“ which it could be possible for him to act
 “ upon it. But at the same time, would
 “ there not be something shocking, in say-
 “ ing of the Deity, that he is nothing but
 “ a power of attraction and repulsion?” *

Dr. Price's conclusion is unfair. For, though Dr. Priestley asserts, that the Deity must have *some* common property with matter; he is far from asserting, that he has no properties but those of matter.

“ What is attraction and repulsion, ‘ says
 “ he in his reply,’ but a power of moving
 “ matter in a certain direction? If the
 “ Deity do act upon matter, he must have
 “ that power, and therefore one property
 “ in common with matter; though he be
 “ possessed of ever so many *other* powers,
 “ of which matter is incapable.” †

But Dr. Priestley will consider, that in this reply he takes for granted, what is a principal

* Free Correspondence, p. 66.

† Free corresp. p. 105.

principal subject of debate, that attraction and repulsion are inherent properties of matter. "I have all along," says Dr. Price, "denied that matter has this power." ‡

It is asserted, "Reflections, &c."§ that an indefinite number of particles, each separately void of perception, or the least apparent approach to it, can not by any combination become possessed of it.

Dr. Price asserts the same "in p. 100, it is said, that *though man is one thinking being, he may consist of many unthinking beings.*— "Nothing can be more incomprehensible to me than this. Is it not the same with saying, that many beings, who want reason, may make one being who has reason? Or that a perfection may exist in the whole, which does not exist in any of the parts."*

It

‡ Free corr. p. 124.

§ Refl. on mat. p. 16.

* Free Cor. p. 123.

It is indeed the very same. For Dr. Price's questions do not exemplify the incomprehensibility of Dr. Priestley's assertion, by placing it in a stronger light; but by a perfect idem. And accordingly Dr. Priestley repeats his assertion: "I find no
 " difficulty in conceiving, that compound
 " substances may have properties, which
 " their component parts cannot have."†

Dr. Priestley's comprehensive conception, is of little avail to his readers: to whom he has not explained, nor endeavoured to explain, so inadmissible a fact. And the observation is of too much importance to be passed so slightly by.

It is asserted, "Reflections, &c." * that there is no material difference between what is called the sleep of the soul after death, and its non-existence.

Dr. Price observes, that "Dr. Priestley
 " should be more explicit in saying which
 " it

† Free Corresp. p. 124.

* Reflect. on Mat. p. 16.

“ it is he believes, the sleep, or the non-existence of the soul after death. There is no less than an infinite difference between these two things.” †

A man, who is eager to know in what this *infinite difference* consists, will be *infinitely* disappointed at being told, the difference consists in this; that “ the former makes a future state, or a restoration of man possible; but if the latter be true, there is an end of all our hopes.”

The difference between a sleeping soul on Dr. Price's system, and a non-existent soul on Dr. Priestley's, is so immaterial; that I am not surprised to see Dr. Priestley assert, that “ they, who maintain the cessation of thought after death, and also the separate existence of the soul, must maintain a doctrine for the sake of an hypothesis.”* Are we more susceptible of enjoyments in a state

† Free Cor. p. 81.

* Free Cor. p. 79.

state of insensibility, than in a state of non-existence. And as to future hopes, and the *possibility* of another existence, the defenders of each system seem to stand on ground nearly the same. The one supposes the soul to remain after death in a state capable of renovation, the other in a state of sleep capable of being roused from it at the resurrection.

Dr. Priestley has maintained, that the *powers* of sensation and thought must necessarily remain after death: the matter of which the organization consisted, in its own nature unperishable, having only changed its form of existing, and not lost its existence. And this I must confess, appears to me a more intelligible, consistent system, than the other. *Matter* is on Dr. Price's own hypothesis *inert*: and I suppose we are to understand by an *immaterial* principle, a principle, *not* inert, but *active*. Now that
a prin-

a principle, by nature active, should continue to exist after the destruction of the body, for no other purpose whatever, than the important business of sleeping, perhaps a million of years, is a doctrine, which, without the express authority of scripture, is inadmissible: and is implicated too with a variety of difficulties.

Is for instance, what is called the *sleep* of the soul, a state of absolute inertion? If so, in what does the substance of the soul in sleep differ from matter? If the soul may be supposed to inform bodies without occupying space, how may we conceive that to be effected, except by its velocity. And if deprived of the power of velocity, as in a state of rest, will it not in that state possess locality? If so, where doth it after death pass its inglorious slumbers? These and other difficulties, that might be recounted are necessarily involved in the doctrine of a
sleeping

Sleeping soul: which Dr. Priestley very compendiously gets rid of by the destruction of it; and from which the doctrine of an intermediate state, as effectually, and more comfortably relieves us,

I am very sorry to find both these writers severally introducing on this occasion Dr. Price's political pamphlet, which is exceedingly foreign to it; and seems forced in, as if to challenge new notice. I confess myself not inclined to turn my pen that way. Science is of no party: and a genuine love of knowledge is debased by an alloy of party zeal. On a subject general as the present point of controversy, truth is my only object; and my antagonist becomes my friend: being both engaged in the same uninterested pursuit:

"Tros Rutuluse fuat, nullo discrimine habebo."



R. P.

F I N I S.